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The Footprint of the Chinese Petro-Dragon:
The Future of Investment Law in
Transboundary Resources
Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez*
Chinese offshore investments in the oil and gas sector around the world are on the rise.
Like dragons roaming the seas trying to dominate the tides, Chinese state-owned companies are
particularly eager to bidfor oilfields in maritime borderlines. This Article tells the story ofhow
Chinese state-owned companies are overpaying for oil on the US-Mexico boundary to gather
experience on how China's global competitors handle resource development conflicts. My
argument is that Chinese participation in transboundary field development fits within a long-
term strategy to master international egal regimes. The presence of these petro-dragons in
borderlines is an example of the use of law as a tool for a rising global power; of an effort to
acquire the legal know-how ofexisting dominant actors to eventually recalibrate itfor the benefit
of the Chinese people in the South China Sea. From now on, the United States will have to
consider the example it is setting for its junior rival in joint resource development zones. Petro-
dragons are loose and drilling in the high seas, ready to bring home what they learn from the
West. Is the North American region preparedfor the challenge?
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I. INTRODUCTION
In ancient imperial China, dragons were mythical creatures that
symbolized dominant power. Dragons were usually depicted forcefully
controlling water, rainfall, and floods.' They were the masters of the
seas and the emblem of imperial Chinese power represented in the
emperor's robes, palaces, and national flags. Today, Chinese national
symbols are no longer these mythical creatures, but rather gold stars
that represent communism and the people. However, the Chinese state-
owned companies' business strategies do resemble the dragons'
eagerness to dominate the high seas and their resources. They invest in
offshore areas where profits are dubious,2 they buy interests in oil fields
that are about to decline in production,3 and they bid aggressively for
blocks located in borderland areas where two or more states share the
property of the resources.' There is nothing irrational with the dragon-
1. Chinese Dragon, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.newworldencyclopedia.
org/entry/Chinese dragon (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
2. Alexi Mostrous, China Takes Control ofNorth Sea Oil Drilling, TIMEs (Aug. 23,
2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/china-takes-control-of-north-sea-
drilling-Op77tdqrm.
3. Nexen Announces Gulf of Mexico joint Venture Partnership, NEXEN (Nov. 30,
2011) https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2011/11/30/1362492/0/en/Nexen-
Announces-Gulf-of-Mexico-Joint-Venture-Partnership.html.
4. Jer6nimo Mohar, Oil Auction Brings Some Good News to Mexico, and China Is
Eager to Capitalize, WORLD POL. REv. (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/
articles/20806/oil-auction-brings-some-good-news-to-mexico-and-china-is-eager-to-capitalize.
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like attitude of the Chinese companies. Rather, it is a well-conceived
strategy to secure resources for mainland China and, as I argue in this
Article, to reshape the architecture of oil and gas operations around the
world for the benefit of Chinese interests.
This Article tells the story of the rise of the Chinese dragon in
transboundary field development and how Mexico and the United
States have slowly opened the door for these dragons to roam the Gulf
of Mexico. How and why was the door left open? It all started in 2012
when the United States and Mexico signed an international treaty for
the safe and efficient exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon
resources in the Gulf of Mexico (2012 Treaty).' As part of the 2012
Treaty, both nations pledged to enact common safety and
environmental standards applicable to the maritime border, to design a
model unitization agreement that is to be negotiated by the
hydrocarbon field operators on each side of the border, and to approve
the final unitization agreement proposed by the operators.6 It has been
five years since the 2012 Treaty entered into force, and Mexico and the
United States have still not come up with the required standards and
draft contracts.! However, this inaction has not stopped both
governments from leasing blocks at the border, despite the lack of clear
and agreed-upon standards.' One actor in particular has been very
active in trying to establish its presence in, and even full control of, the
fields located in the U.S.-Mexico maritime border: the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).9
This state-owned "dragon" bid aggressively in the last two
deepwater auctions on the Mexican side and has been active on the U.S.
side of the border as well.'o In recent years, the Chinese acquired the
5. Agreement Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of
Mexico, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 20, 2012, T.I.A.S.No. 14-0718 [hereinafter 2012 Treaty]; Guillermo
J. Garcia Sanchez & Richard J. McLaughlin, The 2012 Agreement on the Exploitation of
Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources in the Gulf of Mexico: Confirmation of the Rule or
Emergence ofa New Practice?, 37 Hous. J. INT'L L. 681, 745-46 (2015).
6. 2012 Treaty, supra note 5, art. 19; Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 770-71.
7. See Treaties, BUREAU OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/Treaties/
(last visited Dec. 26, 2019) (explaining both governments' actions after signing the 2012
Treaty).
8. Mohar, supra note 4.
9. Id.
10. In Round 1.4 CNOOC was the winning bidder for Area 1 located in the Perdido
Belt, just 6.5km from U.S. territory, offering the Mexican government an additional royalty of
17.01%. Mexico's Deepwater Round Ends in Success, OFFSHORE ENGINEER (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.oedigital.com/news/447774-mexico-s-deepwater-round-ends-in-success. The only
other bidder, out of fourteen international companies that participated, offered only a 6.65%
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Canadian company Nexen, which is currently jointly developing three
offshore fields on the Louisiana coast." CNOOC is also a partner of
the Norwegian state-owned company Statoil (now known as Equinor)
in four deepwater fields in the Gulf.2 One of them, Logan-1, is located
right across the maritime border with Mexico.13 The presence of
CNOOC at the borderline fields presents challenges for Mexico and
the United States. As they codevelop the regulation and model
contracts for the Gulf of Mexico, they have to be conscious that China
will have a front seat to the type of regulation coming out of their
negotiations.
CNOOC's presence at the border is of particular interest since
China is embedded in an international territorial dispute over the South
China Sea and its deepwater transboundary resources.4 The way the
United States and Mexico engage (but most importantly, the way the
United States engages with its southern counterpart) will impact how
the Chinese will design their policies toward their neighbors in the
South China Sea. In other words, U.S.-Mexico practice will set a
precedent under international law and binational custom regarding the
way common pool resources are exploited in deepwater fields."
Many have written about the expansion of Chinese influence in
international legal regimes.'6 Even though there might be a
additional royalty. Id. In Round 2.4 the same company came close to obtaining a second field
located at the border, Area 2, but lost against an association between Shell and PEMEX that
offered only 3.57% more than CNOOC. Nicolas Borda et al., Mexico: Bid Round 2.4 Results,
HAYNES BOONE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.haynesboone.com/-/media/files/alert-pdfs/2018/
mexico bid round_24_C31048CC1498BDD5A647139.
11. Jameson Berkow, 'A Parade ofBroken Promises': How CNOOC Stumbled with
Its Nexen Takeover, BNN BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.bnn.ca/a-parade-of-
broken-promises-how-cnooc-stumbled-with-its-nexen-takeover-1.857533.
12. Cyrus Sanati, Statoil Sells US. Oil Interest o Chinese Company, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
4, 2009), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/statoil-sells-us-oil-interest-to-chinese-
company/.
13. See GoM- Statoil Sells Licence Interests to CNOOC, ENERGY-PEDIA NEWS (Nov.
5, 2009), https://www.energy-pedia.com/news/gulf-of-mexico/statoil-sells-licence-interests-
to-cnooc.
14. See generally Bernard Oxman, The South China Sea Arbitration Award (Univ. of
Miami Legal Studies Research PaperNo. 16-41, Aug. 29,2016), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract
=2835534 (explaining award in South China Sea arbitration between China and the
Philippines).
15. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 686-87.
16. See generally MATTHi-EU BURNAY, CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON THE INTERNATIONAL
RULE OF LAW: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ONE-PARTY STATE (Jan Wouters ed., 2018)
(discussing the development of China's views on the international rule of law); NOAH
FELDMAN, COOL WAR: THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION (1st ed. 2013) (examining the
future of international regimes in light of U.S.-Chinese relations); HENRY KISSINGER, ON
[Vol. 94:313316
2020] FOOTPRINT OF THE CHINESE PETRO-DRA GON 317
disagreement about whether the Chinese clout is a threat to Western
values or rather a reinforcement of the existing regime, there is no
doubt among scholars that Beijing is playing a long game to influence
existing institutions to the advantage of the Chinese people.17 This
Article contributes to the current literature on the topic by adding the
influence of Chinese investments in the oil and gas sector. It tells the
story of the strategic moves made by China to help define
transboundary hydrocarbon legal regimes around the world. As such,
this Article uses as an example the elements of the 2012 Treaty between
the United States and Mexico that I believe are precedent-setting for
China on how to deal with transboundary hydrocarbon resources.
Beijing and Washington are in a similar bargaining position with their
neighbors." They both have the military and economic power to
CHINA (2011) (offering a diplomat's perspective on China's international development both
past and future); CHING KWAN LEE, THE SPECTER OF GLOBAL CHINA: POLITICS, LABOR, AND
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AFRICA (2017) (examining China's international investments in
African nations); Cai Congyan, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment
Treaty Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 J. INT'L EcON.
L. 457 (2009) (discussing future impact of a U.S.-China BIT on international regimes); Diane
A. Desierto, Rewriting the New "Great Game ": China, the United States, and their
International Public Lawyers, 1 PEKING U. TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 351 (2013) (explaining the
role of Chinese legal scholars and lawyers in postmodern international law); Julian Ku, China
and the Future of International Adjudication, 27 MD. J. INT'L L. 154 (2012) (discussing
China's growing participation in international dispute resolution tribunals); Joshua
Kurlantzick, China's New Diplomacy and Its Impact on the World, 14 BROwN J. WORLD AFF.
221 (2007) (analyzing the influence ofChina's expanded international policies); Eric A. Posner
& John Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1 (2006) (imagining
the application of international law to China's growing role in geopolitics); Gregory Shaffer &
Henry Gao, A New Chinese Economic Law Order? (Univ. of Cal. Irvine Sch. of Law Research
Paper No. 2019-21. Apr. 11, 2019), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=337
0452 [hereinafter Shaffer & Gao 2019]; Mark Wu, The "China, Inc. " Challenge to Global
Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT'L L.J. 261, 266 (2016) (analyzing the WTO's effectiveness
in light of China's unique and growing economic structure); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to
Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV.
901, 904 (2006) (discussing the impact of China's WTO membership and differing intellectual
property ideology on international trade); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting
Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 131 (2000)
(examining the past and future of American intellectual property foreign policy in light of
China's rise); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China
Puzzle, in OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2 (2007) (discussing the role
of China's expanded intellectual property regime in its global economic development); Kerry
Brown, China's Exceptionalism Rewrites the Western Political Playbook, EcoNOMIST (June
13, 2018), https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/06/13/chinas-exceptionalism-rewrites-
the-western-political-playbook.
17. See Ku, supra note 16, at 155.
18. KISSINGER, supra note 16, at 487 ("[T]he United States and China perceived that
they needed each other because both were too large to be dominated, too special to be
transformed, and too necessary to each other to be able to afford isolation.").
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leverage the negotiation with neighboring states in their favor.19
Moreover, they both have strategic geopolitical reasons to advance the
development of oil fields in their territorial seas.
Part II of this Article describes how the expansion of Chinese
influence in the development of international oil and gas law fits under
its broader strategy to emulate U.S. dominance in international legal
institutions.2 0 It highlights the rise of Chinese investments in foreign
offshore drilling operations and the significance of its geopolitical role.
Part III analyzes how the strategies employed by China to participate
in the international legal regime on transboundary resources fits under
its emulation strategy. It explores the use of China's state-owned
companies as proxies of the Chinese government to participate in
deepwater field auctions, to be part of the negotiation of unitization
agreements, and to take a front-seat role in the development of
transboundary fields. Part IV then describes the precedent-setting
elements of the 2012 Treaty that deviate from customary international
law and closes by highlighting the red flags inherent with Mexico and
the United States enacting new regulations implementing the 2012
Treaty with loose "dragons" swimming in the Gulf.
II. DRAGONS EMULATING THE AMERICAN EAGLE
In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith wrote that "[t]he love of
our own nation ... often disposes us to view, with the most malignant
jealousy and envy, the prosperity and aggrandisement of any other
neighbouring nation."2 1 Under this view, states that are in direct
competition with each other are threatened by the development of their
peers. In Smith's view, international commerce deepens the "anxiety
about national security."22 The only way to break the vicious security
cycle is through "national emulation."2 3
National emulation is a process in which the anxiety is diminished
by admiring the "excellence of others" and initiating a race to supplant
the competitor instead of grieving their existence.24 Global power
19. Id. at 491.
20. Shaffer & Gao 2019, supra note 16, at 1-2.
21. IsTvAN HONT, JEALOUSY OF TRADE: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND THE
NATION-STATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 115 (2005) (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY
OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 269 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2004)).
22. Id.
23. Id at 115-16.
24. Id at 117 (quoting SMITH, supra note 21, at 133).
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dynamics have drastically changed since the end of the Cold War.2 5
Today, China is increasing its influence and challenging Western
domination over international legal structures.26 That is, China seeks to
set the rules of the game in international politics, 27 a role that
historically belonged to the United States and Western democracies.28
This rise in leadership is driven partly by the vacuum left by the decline
of U.S. influence in rulemaking authority-which was not taken up by
global institutions, as expected by liberal scholars-on which rising
economic and military powers, such as China, capitalized.29 The
Chinese effort to fill the vacuum has become clearer after the swearing
in of President Donald Trump and the encroachment of power of
President Xi Jinping, who casts himself as the leader of the rule-based
international trading system.3 0
However, the process of Chinese domination over the enactment
of new international rules did not happen overnight. China first learned
to play with the standards set up by Western democracies in legal
regimes, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs), and then began to modify them through
25. See generally William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law:
Structural Realignment and Substantive Pluralism, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2015) (noting that
the rise of Brazil, India, and China has had a profound change on global politics); Posner &
Yoo, supra note 16 (analyzing China's growing role in geopolitics).
26. FELDMAN, supra note 16, at 16; Wu, supra note 16, at 262-64; Peter S. Goodman,
In Era of Trump, China's President Champions Economic Globalization, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/business/dealbook/world-economic-forum-davos-
china-xi-globalization.html; Eswar Prasad, How China Aims to Limit the West's Global
Influence, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/opinion/china-
west-democracy.html.
27. DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE
MODERN WORLD 205 (2011); Kurlantzick, supra note 16, at 222; see KISSINGER, supra note
16; Posner & Yoo, supra note 16; Brock Tessman & Wojtek Wolfe, Great Powers and
Strategic Hedging: The Case of Chinese Energy Security Strategy, 13 INT'L STUD. REV. 214
(2011).
28. Goodman, supra note 26; Prasad, supra note 26; see JONATHAN E. HILLMAN, CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, INFLUENCE AND INFRASTRUCTURE: THE STRATEGIC STAKES
OF FOREIGN PROJECTS (Jan. 2019), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/
190123_HillmanInfluenceandlnfrastructure_WEB v3.pdf; KISSINGER, supra note 16, at 503;
Kurlantzick, supra note 16.
29. Burke-White, supra note 25, at 2.
30. See Goodman, supra note 26.
320 TULANE LAWREVIEW [Vol. 94:313
practice, litigation, and negotiation.3 1 The area of international oil and
gas contracts is in line with this expansion of Chinese influence.32
This Article tells one part of this broader story about geopolitics
and international law. It tells the story of how China, through its state-
owned companies, has been expanding its influence in offshore drilling
areas.33 As this Part will explain, the Chinese-controlled companies are
learning how to drill, operate, and develop fields in the most dangerous
and sophisticated parts of the ocean.3 4 Moreover, they are learning how
to negotiate, draft, and design contracts to exploit resources located in
the borderlands of other nations.3 5 They are learning how to navigate
the different legal layers involving transboundary hydrocarbon
reservoirs, especially the practice by which developed states create
customary norms for exploitation of joint fields with their neighbors.3 6
The Chinese state-owned companies are gaining this expertise
even in places where other international companies find it
economically unfeasible.37 For CNOOC, investing in areas with low
31. Ku, supra note 16, at 156, 164; Posner & Yoo, supra note 16, at 13; Shaffer & Gao
2019, supra note 16, at 1-2; Manik V. Suri, Conceptualizing China Within the Kantian Peace,
54 HARV. INT'L L.J. 219, 249-51 (2013); Wu, supra note 16, at 262-64; see FELDMAN, supra
note 16; Burke-White, supra note 25; Desierto, supra note 16. Another area where China is
emulating the West is the internationalization of its currency. See Weitseng Chen, Size
Matters? Renminbi Internationalization and the Beying Consensus, in THE BEIJING
CONSENSUS? How CHINA HAS CHANGED WESTERN IDEAS OF LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 144, 144-45 (Weitseng Chen ed., 2017) ("'Currency War,' a best seller in
China that Chinese leaders have reportedly read, engages in a conspiracy theory depicting how
the United States and its investment banks made the US dollar the international reserve
currency. Commentators have therefore established that currency internationalization requires
strong state action at a critical juncture.... The long-term goal of the RMB internationalization
scheme (the 'Scheme') is to make the Chinese yuan an international settlement, investment,
and reserve currency.").
32. Xiaojie Xu, Chinese NOCs' Overseas Strategies: Background, Comparison and
Remarks 3-4 (Mar. 2007) (unpublished paper) (on file with James A. Baker M Institute of
Public Policy Rice University), bakerinstitute.org/media/files/page/94235e0c/noc-chinese
nocs xu.pdf.
33. YERGIN, supra note 27, at 204-07.
34. See id
35. See Nat'l Hydrocarbons Comm'n & China Offshore Oil Corp. E&P Mex.,
Contrato para la Exploraci6n y Extraccidn de Hidrocarburos Bajo la Modalidad de Licencia
en Agus Profundas, Contrato No. CNH-ROI-LO4-Al.CPP/2016 (Mar. 10, 2017) [hereinafter
CNOOC-Mexico Contract].
36. See, e.g., Xu, supra note 32, at 11 (noting CNOOC has closely cooperated with
international partners).
37. ERICA STRECKER DOwNS, CHINA'S QUEST FOR ENERGY SECURITY 15-17 (2000);
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 206; ERICA DOwNS, COLUMBIA SIPA CTR. ON GLOB. ENERGY
POLICY, THE RISE OF CHINA'S INDEPENDENT REFINERIES 16-17 (Sept. 2017), https://energy
policy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/CGEPTheRiseofChinasfndependentRefineries917.pdf;
JULIE JIANG & JONATHAN SINTON, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, IEA ENERGY PAPERS 2011/3,
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economic returns is not only a financial transaction, but also an
investment in the creation of skills that will allow them to push the
boundaries of international petroleum contracts and related treaties
when the appropriate time comes. Critics have called this type of
investment a strategy for "domination of energy markets and of the
Western Pacific."39 As with many things, the Chinese are playing a
long-term game, even if they lose some profitability in the short-term.4 0
A key component of any oil and gas investment abroad is the
protection afforded by investment treaties.4 ' The following subpart
analyzes how the Beijing government is emulating U.S. policy to
expand protection of foreign investment now that the Chinese state-
owned companies have become important exporters of capital in the
oil and gas sector.
A. Emulating and Recalibrating the Investment Regime
The U.S. BITs after the Cold War were signed with clear
objectives. On one hand, the goal was to protect U.S. and European
investors abroad through a "stable legal framework."42 The United
States felt that it was up to the importers of capital, mainly developing
countries, to adapt their legal frameworks in exchange for American
foreign direct investment. On the other hand, the treaties gave the
investors their own dispute resolution mechanism to insulate the U.S.
government from becoming involved in diplomatic protection issues.4 3
The question on how the system would affect the flow of foreign
investment into the United States was not an objective in the design of
the regime. In the words of Jos6 Alvarez, who negotiated some of the
OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS BY CHINESE NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES 9 (Feb. 2011), https://www.
oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5kgglrwdrvvd-en.pdf~expires=1 574444237&id=id&accname=guest
&checksum=792AF56E94DF02CC8983A33B1B036476; Erica S. Downs, The Chinese
Energy Security Debate, 2004 CHINA Q. 21, 25, 33 (2004); Erica Downs, China's Oil
Investment Is Not a Threat, FOREIGN POL'Y (Oct. 10, 2012, 8:49 PM), https://foreignpolicy.
com/2012/10/10/Chinas-oil-investment-is-not-a-threat/.
38. YERGIN, supra note 27, at 204-08; JIANG & SINTON, supra note 37, at 9-23.
39. YERGIN, supra note 27, at 205 (quoting National Security Implications of the
Possible Merger of the China National Off-Shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) with UNOCAL
Corporation: Hearing Before the H Comm. on Armed Services, 109th Cong. 6 (2005)
[hereinafter UNOCAL Hearing] (statement of R. James Woolsey, Vice President, Booz Allen
Hamilton)).
40. See id. at 204-07.
41. Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez, The Hydrocarbon Industry's Challenge to
International Investment Law: A Critical Approach, 57 HARV. INT'L L.J. 475, 483 (2016).
42. J.E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT, 7 TRANSNAT'LDisP. MGMT. 1, 3 (2010).
43. Id.
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BITs at that time, "the treaty's references to 'reciprocal' investment
flows was something of a fraud."4 4 Few at that time thought that the
United States needed to change its own legislation, or that it could
eventually become a respondent in an investment claim.45
In the same vein, the U.S. model BIT reflected the American view
of how the international economy should look in a post-Cold War
scenano:
The United States sold its BIT in this period as an essential (but minimal)
building block to a free market economy and to the construction of the
rule of law. Signing a U.S. BIT, we said, would send a signal that a
country had accepted the basic premises of liberal economic theory
46
This imposition of an exporting capital country upon the capital-
seeking developing nation was adopted and replicated by most of
Western nations.4 7 In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. model BIT became
the baseline for the new BITs signed around the world.4 8 The United
States was becoming the hegemon imposing its vision on how the
market should be regulated, or unregulated, and on the role that
international law played in it.4 9 At least in the discourse, the other
economic and political models had failed.o Socialism and import
substitution economies were seen as examples of failed policies." The
United States was leading the dialogue by using a discourse on
"efficien[cy]," "market failures," and insulation of investments from
the threat of national politics in the developing world; everyone else
was echoing behind.5 2
The only exception to this policy was the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), where Canada was a signing party. As
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id at 5.
47. Id
48. Id ("[M]any modeled closely on the U.S. model-as a perfect storm inspired by
the victory of the Capitalist West over what was then its only rivals: failed import substitution
schemes or planned economies under socialist and communist regimes.").
49. Id at 5-6.
50. Id at 6.
51. For a discussion of the development of modem Western economic and legal
models, see David Kennedy, The "Rule of Law," Political Choices, and Development
Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); David M. Trubek, The "Rule of Law" in
Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra.
52. Alvarez, supra note 42, at 5-6.
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opposed to all the other U.S. BIT partners, Canada was a significant
exporter of foreign investment into the United States. This fact, years
later, placed the United States in an exceptional situation. Instead of
only reacting to the interpretation of the norms that affected developing
countries in their struggle to attract foreign investment, the United
States became a target of litigation from Canadian investors.5 3 By 2018,
the United States was the only significant capital exporter that had been
sued twenty-one times in investment tribunals.5 4 The vast majority of
those cases involved governmental actions taken against Canadian
companies; however, there are also cases concerning Uruguayan,"
567Panamanian,5 and Peruvian investments.5 7 The type of cases varied:
from challenging legislation enacted by the local government in
California, to the jury system in Mississippi, the United States was
accused of violating the articles that were initially intended to protect
U.S. investors alone." This participation has allowed the United States
to experience firsthand the power of the tribunals.
The unexpected experience had an impact on the United States'
view of the regime. On one hand, the United States disliked the broad
interpretations that arbitral tribunals were having in cases where the
United States was involved; on the other, the treaty constructions from
53. See, e.g., ADF Grp. Inc. v. United States of Am., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1,
Award (Jan. 9, 2003), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/233043.pdf (entering
an award in the dispute filed by a Canadian investor arising from construction work in the
United States); Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States of Am., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1,
Award (Aug. 25, 2014), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/233043.pdf
(issuing an award in the Canadian investor Apotex's NAFTA complaint against the United
States); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of Am., Award (June 8, 2009), https://2009-2017.
state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf (evaluating a dispute between the United States
and the Canadian company Glamis Gold pursuant to a mining venture in California). See
generally Cases Filed Against the United States ofAmerica, U.S. DEP'T STATE, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/s/1/c3741.htm (last updated Jan. 20, 2017) (cataloguing cases filed against the
United States).
54. Geraldo Vidigal & Beatriz Stevens, Brazil's New Model ofDispute Settlement for
Investment: Return to the Past or Alternative for the Future?, 19 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 475,
481 (2018).
55. See Italba Corp. v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/16/19, Award
(Mar. 22, 2019), italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl0439.pdf.
56. See Renco Grp. Inc. v. Republic of Peru, UNCT/13/1, Final Award (Nov. 9,2016),
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw774
4_1.pdf.
57. See Transglob. Green Energy, LLC v. Republic of Pan., ICSID Case No. ARB/
13/28, Award (June 2, 2016), italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7336.pdf.
58. Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, at 2-
3 (June 26, 2003), italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO470.pdf; Methanex Corp.
v. United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, at 1 (Aug. 3, 2005), italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf; Alvarez, supra note 42, at 8.
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other tribunals, particularly the ones connected to the Argentinean
crisis, were signaling that the open texture of the treaty was being
interpreted against state actions in times of crisis.5 9 Nevertheless, the
United States did not decide to abandon the regime; rather, it decided
to recalibrate it.6 0 It did so in two separate ways: (1) by signaling to the
tribunals its concern about the NAFTA Joint Commission's
interpretations and (2) by reforming its model BIT in 2004 to include
more specific principles, removing some of the open text left in the first
model.6' According to Alvarez, "Apart from restricting the scope of
what once were far more open-ended investor protections, the new
2004 Model further restricts the discretion of arbitrators charged with
deciding investor-state disputes."62
The U.S. model BIT went from being a straitjacket on states to
avoid market interventions to a treaty that respects the right of
"sovereigns" to respond to market failures.63 The latest iteration of the
U.S. reluctance to use investment tribunals to protect foreign
investment can be seen in the Trump Administration's position in the
renegotiation of NAFTA. In the blunt words of the U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Lighthizer:
I've had people come in and say, literally, to me: 'Oh, but you can't do
this: you can't change ISDS.... You can't do that because we wouldn't
have made the investment otherwise.' I'm thinking, 'Well, then why is it
a good policy of the United States government to encourage investment
in Mexico?' ... The bottom line is, business says 'We want to make
decisions and have markets decide. But! We would like to have political
risk insurance paid for by the United States' government.' And to me
that's absurd. You either are in the market, or you're not in the market.M
59. Alvarez, supra note 42, at 8-9.
60. See id at 9.
61. Alvarez, supra note 42, at 8-9; see also CAMPBELL McLACRLAN, LAURENCE SHORE
& MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE
PRINCIPLES 22-23 (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2007) (noting the 2004 U.S. Model BIT incorporated
provisions reflecting the public interest of states); North American Free Trade Agreement:
Notes ofInterpretation of Certain Chapter 1] Provisions, GLOBAL AFF. CAN. (July 31, 2001),
https://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-
diff/NAFTA-Interpr.aspx?lang-eng [hereinafter FTC Notes of Interpretation] (clarifying
terms of NAFTA provisions).
62. Alvarez, supra note 42, at 10.
63. Id. at 12-14.
64. Phil Levy, Critique of NAFTA Provision Highlights Team Trump's
Misconceptions on Investment Abroad, FORBES (Oct. 23,2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
phillevy/2017/10/23/should-team-trump-encourage-investment-in-mexico/#4e9fe2e27064; see
also Janyce McGregor, Why NAFTA's Unloved Investor-State Dispute Chapter May Be in
Trouble, CBC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nafta-isds-weekend-
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At the same time that the United States is recalibrating its role in
the investment regime, the rise of China as a significant capital exporter
shows signs that it is willing to emulate the policies implemented by
the United States in the past.65 For many years, Beijing was reluctant to
sign BITs.66 The central government believed that these international
treaties were instruments of colonialism that referred to customary law
where the developing world, and particularly China, had not had the
chance to participate in the creation of the regime.6 7 In the past fifteen
years, this view has changed. As Chinese capital is invested around the
developed and developing world, China has been more inclined to
adopt the rules of investment treaties as its own and to emulate the U.S.
policy on investment.68 The mere fact that it has now become the
second largest BIT-signer proves this new policy.69
1. The Recognition of Investment Tribunals as a Dispute
Resolution Mechanism
The first change in Chinese perception toward BITs can be found
in the consent of the state to submit the disputes arising from the treaty
to international arbitration." Before becoming a significant capital
exporter, most Chinese BITs limited the dispute resolution mechanism
available to investors to national courts.7 ' The foreign investor could
only bring a claim to an arbitration tribunal to determine the amount of
compensation for expropriation.72 The exact text in the treaties stated
that foreign investors could only bring claims "to the competent court
of the Contracting Party accepting the investment."73 From China's
1.4814141 (detailing ongoing problems between North American States attempting to form a
new trade treaty).
65. Shaffer & Gao 2019, supra note 16, at 1-2; see LEE, supra note 16, at 1-11
(describing how China has expanded its FDI in developing nations).
66. See Guang Hong, Scope of Arbitration in Chinese BITs: Policies & Implications
(Nov. 1, 2009) (unpublished J.D. article), https://works.bepress.com/guang_hong/l/.
67. See generally Matthew Craven, What Happened to Unequal Treaties? The
Continuities of Informal Empire, 74 NoRDic J. INT'L L. 335 (2005) (discussing the history of
unequal treaties in colonial policy).
68. Alvarez, supra note 42, at 10-15; Congyan, supra note 16, at 459-61.
69. Hong, supra note 66, at 5.
70. Id at 9.
71. Id. at 6-8.
72. Id.
73. That explains why the Chinese BITs have only been litigated on one occasion. See
Ko-Yung Tung & Rafael Cox-Alomar, The New Generation of China BITs in Light of Tza
Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 461, 464 (2006); see also Hong, supra
note 66, at 16 (noting the language of a BIT may determine the jurisprudence of an arbitration
tribunal). For a case where a similar clause was reviewed and the investor was forced to bring
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perspective, foreign direct investment was an issue strictly related to
the capital being imported to the Chinese territory, and in that sense,
China "viewed the ability to adjudicate issues arising from these
investments as a matter of state sovereignty.",4
This policy has changed now that China is a capital exporter.
Today, Chinese companies, mainly state-owned companies, are
investing abroad in strategic areas such as mining and hydrocarbons
exploitation.76  This new capital exporting role has forced the
government o review its BITs. For starters, Beijing has considered that
submitting Chinese interests to domestic courts is no longer an option.77
The government in Beijing now has included the traditional clause that
"[a]ny dispute concerning investments" at the request of the investor
could be submitted to international arbitration. In practice, this means
that any state's act that affects Chinese companies, or the foreign
capitals in China, under the scope of the treaty could be claimed before
an international tribunal without the need to address it first in the
national courts.
2. A Second Common Ground: The Fair and Equitable Treatment
An example of emulation that helps us to prove that China is
willing to follow the steps of the United States is its approach to the fair
and equitable treatment principle (FET principle). Before analyzing the
emulation of Chinese policy toward this principle, it is important to
understand its evolution in the regime built by the United States.7 9
the claim first to national courts, see Berschader v. Russia Fed'n (Beg. v. Rus.), SCC Case No.
080/2004, Award (Apr. 21, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0079_0.pdf.
74. Hong, supra note 66, at 20.
75. Id at 21 ("[T]he rising capital of outward FDI from China would eventually steer
future Chinese BITs in a new light and incentivize treaties that incorporate a full scope of
arbitral dispute resolution.").
76. Jude Webber, China Boosts Mexico Ties by Grabbing Blocks in Oil Auction, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2006), https://www.ft.com/content/9982457e-bb31-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d808.
77. Hong, supra note 66, at 22 ("Since SOEs are administered by China's central
government, any disputes other than the amount of compensation in an event of expropriation
would directly impinge upon the economic welfare of the Chinese government. But to make
matters worse the institutions that have this power are foreign domestic courts. The idea that
domestic courts of a foreign country may one day exercise jurisdiction over China's SOEs and
thus decide the economic interest of the Chinese government must not have been considered
when First Generation BITs were drafted.").
78. Id at 10 (emphasis added) (quoting Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, China-Ger., art. 9, Dec. 1, 2003, 2362 U.N.T.S. 253).
79. See Alvarez, supra note 42.
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The U.S. nationals were some of the first to encounter a case
where the principle was given substance.so In Neer v. Mexico, the
tribunal resolved that the "propriety of governmental acts should be put
to the test of international standards" and that the "treatment of an alien,
in order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an
outrage, to bad faith, to wilful [sic] neglect of duty, or to an
insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international
standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily
recognize its insufficiency."" This standard of government action was
later called a "minimum treatment" of aliens under customary
international law.82 This standard encompassed fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security from governmental
intervention.83
The United States then adopted the FET principle in its Friendship
and Navigation Treaties,8 4 and in the 1990s, the standard became part
of NAFTA's Chapter XI." NAFTA's Article 1105 established that
"[e]ach Party shall accord to investments ofinvestors ofanother Party
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment andfull protection and security. "86
As cases involving the treatment of foreigners began to be
litigated, tribunals interpreted the principle and expanded it according
to the challenges faced by modem investments. For example, some
tribunals had to resolve questions on the link between the FET principle
of full protection and security and fair and equitable treatment..
Moreover, some tribunals discussed whether the FET principle
80. See General Claims Convention, Mex.-U.S., Sept. 8, 1923,43 Stat. 1730; Judicial
Decisions Involving Questions ofInternational Law: Neer v. Mexico (Oct. 15, 1926), 21 AM.
J. INT'L L. 555, 555 (1927). The tribunal was constituted according to the General Claims
Convention of 1923 that had as its goals to address all the losses and damages inflicted upon
citizens of both countries by the U.S. and Mexican Governments.
81. Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law, supra note 80, at
555-56.
82. Amicus Brief of Nat'1 Ass'n Mfrs., at 15, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, Case No.
UNCT/14/2 (Feb. 12, 2016), italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7109.pdf.
83. Id
84. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Ger.-U.S., Oct. 29, 1954, 7
U.S.T. 1839, 1841.
85. RUDOLPH DOLZER & CRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 152-53 (2008).
86. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1105(1), Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 IM 289 [hereinafter NAFTA] (emphasis added).
87. See Amicus Brief of Nat'l Ass'n Mfrs., supra note 82, at 15.
88. See id.
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awarded a higher protection than that afforded to their nationals.89
Some tribunals came to the controversial conclusion that the concept
encompassed an international right to transparency.90 These tribunals
also considered that breaches of international law were in and of
themselves evidence of unfair treatment to the investors.9' Such a broad
interpretation was not welcomed by the United States and its NAFTA
partners. In an effort to recalibrate the broad interpretations, Canada,
Mexico, and the United States published a joint declaration stating that
"[t]he concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and
security' do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which
is required by the customary international law."92
89. Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 122
(Oct. 11, 2002), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ital076.pdf,
Occidental Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Case No. UN 3467, Final
Award ¶¶ 189-190 (London Ct. of Int'l Arb. July 1, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/itaO571.pdf; Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Can., UNCITRAL, Award,
¶ 110 (Apr. 10, 2001), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0678.pdf;
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Can., UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 260 (Nov. 13, 2006), https://www.
uncitral.org/res/transparency-registry/registry/data/can/s d myersinc html/myers-32.pdf. For
other investment cases where these issues were discussed, see Case Concerning Elettronica
Sicula, Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20, 1989); AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of
Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award (Sept. 23, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italaw4495 pdf, Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire,
ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award (Feb. 21, 1997), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0061.pdf; Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award (July 24, 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0095.pdf; CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic,
UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Sept. 13, 2001), https://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/282;
Compafiia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3,
Award (Aug. 20, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita02O6.
pdf; Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/cases/401; Nobel Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/1 1, Award (Oct 12, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0565.pdf, Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award (Sept 11, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO6l9.pdf;
Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award (Feb. 6, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0790.pdf Suez v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010), https://www.
italaw.com/cases/1057; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/4, Award (Dec. 8, 2000), 41 I.L.M. 896 (2002).
90. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
Award, 170-88 (Aug. 30, 2000); see Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶406-408 (July 14, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0061.pdf (discussing transparency arguments as fair and equitable
treatment).
91. Azurix, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, ¶M406-408; Metalclad, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, ¶M 70-88; Pope & Talbot, UNCITRAL, ¶ 118; S.D. Myers, UNCITRAL,
¶M 262-264.
92. FTC Notes ofInterpretation, supra note 61, art. 2(2).
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The United States even went further with its recalibration and
modified its traditional model BIT. The 2004 U.S. model treaty
specified the cases that Washington considers a breach of the standard,
which were limited to issues related to a denial of justice in criminal,
civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings.9 3 The United States
also reaffirmed the need to link it to customary international law and
due process as interpreted by "the principal legal systems of the
world."9 4
The U.S. reaction was based not only on broad interpretations by
NAFTA tribunals but also on cases where the United States was not a
party to the arbitration.9 5 An example of this broad interpretation can
be found in Occidental v. Ecuador where arbitrators were asked to
decide whether the fact that the claimants had proved a breach of the
protection and discrimination standards implied that a violation of fair
and equitable treatment had also taken place.96 The U.S. 2004 model
BIT clearly rejected this connection and affirmed that a tribunal could
not find a breach of the FET principle as a result of other standards
being breached.9 7 Such a clear rejection of the broad interpretation of
the FET principle forced the new tribunal constituted according to the
2004 U.S. model BIT to find a violation of the treatment without any
link to the other investment principles."
The recalibrating phenomenon is a consequence of a continuous
construction of "common law" among international investment
tribunals.99 Tribunals are aware of each other's interpretations, borrow
analogies, and openly employ the same criteria in an effort to
strengthen their resolutions.'00 The emergence of a "common law" is
93. 2004 U.S. Model BIT art. 5 [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT], https://ustr.gov/archive/
assets/TradeSectors/Investment/ModelBIT/asset upload file847 6897.pdf.
94. Id. art. 2(a). For discussions on the U.S. Model BIT, see Alvarez, supra note 42;
Gilbert Gagn6 & Jean-Frod6ric Morin, The Evolving American Policy on Investment
Protection: Evidence from Recent FTAs and the 2004 Model BIT, 9 J.INT'LECON.L. 357, 364
(2006); Mark Kantor, The New Draft Model U.S. BIT Noteworthy Developments, 21 J. INT'L
ARB. 383, 398 (2004); S.M. Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty: An Exercise in the Regressive Development ofInternational Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L DisP.
MGMT. 1, 7 (2006).
95. Gagn6 & Morin, supra note 94, at 359.
96. Occidental Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Case No. UN
3467, Final Award ¶M 187.
97. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 93, art. 5(3).
98. Occidental, UNCITRAL Case No. UN 3467, T 190.
99. CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 163
(Philippe Sands et al. eds., 1st ed. 2007); Cesare P.R. Romano, Deciphering the Grammar of
the International Jurisprudential Dialogue, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 755, 765 (2008).
100. BROWN, supra note 99; Romano, supra note 99, at 765.
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not without controversy.'o' The fact is, none of the treaties formally
establish the use of precedents as part of the arbitral system.10 2 Most
treaties that create international tribunals are either silent with regard to
the use of precedent or explicitly state that the case decision is only
binding upon the parties that participated in the proceedings.'3
Nevertheless, it is an element that influences judicial behavior and that
affects the way states view international resolutions.'" The use of
precedents has forced third parties with similar treaties to review these
resolutions in the fear that a progressive interpretation might be used
against them in similarly fact based cases.'0o
For example, China has also been monitoring the development of
the FET principle.'0 6 Now a major exporter of capital, Beijing has
closely followed the United States reaction to progressive
interpretations and, most importantly, how Washington has recalibrated
because of them.0 7 Evidence of China's awareness can be found in
their latest BITs where it not only included the amendments of the U.S.
model BIT, but it also added new substantive concepts created through
the tribunals' "common law."' In a way, the Chinese model BIT is
parallelly evolving with the U.S. model BIT.'0 9 Both are interested in
limiting the expansion of an arbitrator's discretion on what the state's
obligations are regarding treating foreign investors in a fair and
equitable way."o As the United States and China seem to reach an
implied consensus on the FET principle, other states will follow."'
Today "the combined capital flows of these two states alone eclipse
those of most other states combined," thus making their views on the
future of investment law some of the most influential for all capital
exporting states.l12
The evolution of the FET principle is illustrated in the following
flow of boxes. The chart shows how each time a tribunal interpreted
101. BROWN, supra note 99.
102. BROWN, supra note 99; Romano, supra note 99, at 764.
103. BROWN, supra note 99; Romano, supra note 99, at 765.
104. BROWN, supra note 99; Romano, supra note 99, at 765.
105. Gilbert Guillaume, The Use ofPrecedent by International Judges andArbitrators,
2 J. INT'L Disp. SETTLEMENT 5, 12 (2011).
106. Alvarez, supra note 42, at 11-12.
107. Id.
108. Id
109. Id. at 15-19; Congyan, supra note 16, at 458-59.
110. FTC Notes ofInterpretation, supra note 61; Alvarez, supra note 42, at 9-11.
111. Alvarez, supra note 42, at 19.
112. Id.
330 [Vol. 94:313
2020] FOOTPRINT OF THE CHINESE PETRO-DRAGON 331
the principle, the United States would react by integrating the new
interpretation, or by recalibrating through the enactment of new
definitions in its BITs. It also shows how China reacted first by
following the United States interpretation, but in the latest stage
recalibrated the principle to its own advantage.
Neer Case (A tribunal found for the first time that "the treatment
of an alien . .. should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful
[sic] neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental
action so far short of international standards that every
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its
insufficiency.")"13
U.S. Incorporation of the Principle
Article 1105 of NAFTA (FET constitutes a part of the
minimum treatment of aliens, but it is not tantamount to
minimum treatment itself.)"14
Metalclad v Mexico Case (The tribunal linked the
FET treatment with transparency.)"
S.D. Myers v Canada Case (The tribunal held that host State's
breach of a rule of international law being specifically designed
to protect investors will also constitute the breach of FET.)l 6
Pope & Talbot v Canada Case (The tribunal considered that FET
treatment should be interpreted to include the "fairness elements
under ordinary standards applied in the NAFTA countries.")"7
113. Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law: Neer v. Mexico,
supra note 80, at 556.
114. NAFTA art. 1105, supra note 86.
115. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
Award, (Aug. 30, 2000).
116. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Can., UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2006), https://www.
uncitral.org/res/transparency-registry/registry/data/can/s d_myers-inc-html/myers-32.pdf.
117. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Can., UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 118 (Apr. 10, 2001), https://
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0678.pdf
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U.S. Recalibration of the Principle
NAFTA Commission ("'[FET]' and 'full protection and security'
do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is
required by the customary international law [MST] ofaliens.")18
U.S. Recalibration of the Chinese Emulation of the
Principle Principle
Article 5(2)(a) and 3 US Article 143 of the China-
Model BIT 2004 ("[T]he New Zealand BIT (2008)
obligation not to deny (FET "in accordance with
justice in criminal, civil, or commonly accepted rules of
administrative adjudicatory international law ...
proceedings in accordance investors are not denied
with the principle of due justice or treated unfairly or
process embodied in the inequitably in any legal or
principal legal systems of administrative proceeding
the world. . . [a] affecting the investments of
determination that there has the investor.")120
been a breach ofanother
provision of this Treaty, or
of a separate international
agreement, does not
establish that there has been
a breach of this Article.")"9
118. FTC Notes of Interpretation, supra note 61, at 2(2) (emphasis added).
119. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 93, at 2(a) and 3 (emphasis added).
120. Free Trade Agreement, China-N.Z., Apr. 7, 2008, 2590 U.N.T.S. 101 art. 143(1)-
(2) (emphasis added).
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Occidental v. Ecuador Case ("[T]he question of whether in
addition there has been a breach of full protection and security
under this Article becomes moot as a treatment hat is not fair
and equitable automatically entails an absence offull protection
and security of the investment."l21 Suez v. Argentina case-"[I]t
is possible for Argentina to violate its obligation of fair and
equitable treatment toward the Claimants without violating its
duty of full protection and security. In short, there are actions
that violate fair and equitable treatment hat do not violate full
protection and security.")122
Chinese Recalibration of the Principle
Article 5 Mexico-China BIT (2008) ("[T/reatment in
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security... For greater
certainty, this Article prescribes the international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of
treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of the other
Contracting Party. The concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment'
and 'full protection and security' do not require treatment in
addition to or beyond that which is required by the international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as evidence ofState
practice and opinio juris. A determination that there has been a
breach of another provision of this Agreement, or ofa separate
international agreement, does not establish that there has been a
breach of this Article. ") 123
The mutual understanding between Beijing and Washington does
not leave the tribunals completely powerless. Ultimately, like any other
broadly defined legal concepts, tribunals could work through their case
121. Occidental Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Case No. UN
3467, Final Award T 187 (London Ct. of Int'l Arb. July 1, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0571.pdf.
122. Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, ¶ 171 Decision on
Liability (July 30, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/cases/1057
123. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China-
Mex., July 11, 2008, 2626 U.N.T.S. 3 art. 5 (emphasis added).
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law and develop new understandings.12 4 Fair and equitable treatment
cases constantly involve the interpretation of broad concepts such as
"due process" in accordance with the "principal legal systems of the
world."l25 Furthermore, international tribunals, when facing common
principles, are borrowing definitions from other regimes. 126 Other
courts, such as the Inter-American Court and the European Court of
Human Rights, have their own precedents on similar concepts.127
Moreover, there is a growing trend of model BITs that foster the
connection between human rights regimes and investment
principles.128 Exporting capital states are now more inclined to accept
government action for the protection of the environment, labor rights,
human rights, and corporate social responsibility.129 For example, the
124. Guillame, supra note 105, at 5.
125. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 93, art. 5(2)(a); see, e.g., Case Concerning
Elettronica Sicula, Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 57 (July 20, 1989) (determining whether the act of
requisitioning a plant constituted taking without due process).
126. Sergio Puig, The Merging of International Trade and Investment Law, 33
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 29-30 (2015).
127. For some of the jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on
the topic, see Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 41 (Sept. 4,
1998); Gutman v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 184 (Aug. 6, 2008); L6pez-Alvarez v. Honduras, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 141 (Feb. 1, 2006); Pueblo
Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 140 (Jan. 31, 2006); Ramirez v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 126 (June 20, 2005). Although the European
Convention on Human Rights does not mention explicitly the right of "due process," it does
mention in Article 5 that "[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law." Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T. 221. It then enumerates what the concept entails.
From a reading of all the enlisted elements, one can draw the conclusion that they are the
different interpretations of the concept of "due process." Due to the length of this Article, the
cases where the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted Article 5 will not be
transcribed. For further research on these cases, see Factsheets, EUR. CT. HUM. RTs., http://
www.echr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx?p=press/factsheets&c= (lastvisited Dec. 26, 2019).
128. Alvarez, supra note 42, at 15.
129. The preamble of the Norwegian Model BIT of 2007 reads as follows:
Desiring to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the protection of
health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized
labour rights; Desiring to contribute to a stable framework for investment in order
to maximize effective and sustainable utilization of economic resources and improve
living standards; Conscious that the promotion and reciprocal protection of
investments in accordance with this Agreement will stimulate the business initiative;
Emphasising the importance of corporate social responsibility; Recognising that the
development of economic and business ties can promote respect for internationally
recognized labour rights; Reaffirming their commitment to democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with their obligations
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Norwegian model BIT preamble includes all these elements as a
reflection of the will of the state to invite arbitral tribunals to balance
the foreign companies' goals and their impact in developing nations.13 0
Investments are not only defined in these new model BITs as tools for
profit but also as instruments that impact social and environmental
rights and that should be able to be restrained through social policies.
B. Chinese Investment and Their Geopolitical Role
As mentioned above, the investment regime was created to
protect foreign investors.'3 ' At that time, most investors were private
parties, global companies, transnational associations, and
multinationals.'3 2 Today, the type of foreign investor that is subject to
the protection of the regime is being challenged by the role that the
Chinese government, and particularly the Communist Party, has in the
expansion of Chinese investment abroad.'33
The Chinese government has made most of its investments in the
United States through the use of state-owned companies and sovereign
wealth funds, legal entities that are not expressly addressed in the
traditional BITs.'34 The Chinese government considers both entities as
an extension of Party dominance. Chinese financial institutions are
"instruments of national economic policy," and the state-owned
companies were born "both commercial and communist at the same
time."'3 5 In the words of Professor Mark Wu, "Alongside the state is
the Chinese Communist Party ... a separate political actor that plays
an active role in the management of state-owned enterprises . . . ." 36
under international law, including the principles set out in the United Nations Charter
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Norway Model BIT pmbl., regjeringen.no/contentassets/e47326b6lf424d4c9c3d4708964926
23/draft-model-agreement-english.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2019); see also Alvarez, supra note
42, at 15 (discussing Norway's extreme efforts to rebalance the rights of investors and states).
130. Norway Model BIT, supra note 129, pmbl.
131. ARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (1995).
132. See id
133. Around 80% of the foreign direct investment from China in other countries is being
done by state-owned companies. Hong, supra note 66, at 21-22. The few "private" Chinese
investors that have invested abroad are in some way related to and dependent on the Chinese
Communist Party. See RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA'S
COMMUNIST RULERS 34-70 (1st U.S. ed. 2010).
134. See Mohar, supra note 4.
135. McGREGORsupra note 133, at 52-53.
136. Wu, supra note 16, at 265.
TULANE LAWREVIEW
Hence, the underlying problem inside China is that it is trying to
emulate a commercial system abroad but is also solving a tension
"between the traditionalists in the Party on the one side, who want to
keep a tight grip on the enterprises, and the increasingly ambitious chief
executives of state companies on the other."1 37 There is an internal
struggle in these companies between playing a capitalist game abroad
and being controlled by the interests of the Communist Party at
home.'3 8 Most treaties include fair and equitable treatment,
nondiscriminatory and national treatment standards, which entail the
United States having to treat these Chinese investors as if they were
American investors, making the decisions from the regulatory agencies
that forbid Chinese presence in certain sectors invalid under the
treaties.39
Take, for example, the case of the Chinese sovereign wealth fund
that owns most of the U.S. public debt. Today's BITs have no provision
regarding the appropriate treatment of this new form of foreign direct
investment.'4 0 The traditional definition of foreign investors in most
BITs allows the possibility of protecting "government-controlled
entities as long as they act in a commercial rather than in a
governmental capacity." 4 ' But sovereign wealth funds do not fall
entirely under the definition of commercial activities of the state.
In general, these funds are institutions that invest in different areas
abroad: they buy shares from banks and companies, they have
expanded into the real estate market, and they have invested in hedge
funds.'4 2 Furthermore, many of these sovereign wealth funds have
passed from a passive strategy of acquiring portfolio investments as
minority shareholders to increasing their control of the companies.143
At the moment, the recipients of those funds have decided to regulate
those that are "established and managed directly or however controlled
by a sovereign state, with multiple investment strategies including the
purchase of shares in companies listed in international markets and
working in areas considered strategic by the states in which they are
137. McGREGOR, supra note 133, at 53.
138. Id. at 49.
139. See Benjamin A. Shobert, US Inches a BIT Closer to China, ASIA TIMEs (May 5,
2010), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ChinaBusiness/LEO5CbOI.html.
140. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 85, at 46.
141. Id.
142. Fabio Bassan, Host States and Sovereign Wealth Funds, Between National
Security and International Law, 21 EUR. Bus. L. REv. 165, 166 (2010).
143. Id. at 167.
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established."'" But regardless of the area of investment or the state
control, these funds could still be acting in a commercial capacity.
As the financial crisis in Europe and the United States accentuated
in 2009, and as the funds became "market stabilizers," this new strategy
generated the type of "jealousy" that Adam Smith depicted in his time:
"The undisguised concern is that a foreign state may take indirect
control of (mostly) European or US private companies working in
strategic industry sectors."14 5
The conceptual problem with these funds is that their new
financial strategies are challenging the traditional understating of what
constitutes a private act of the state or a private foreign investor. Even
assuming that the sovereign wealth funds do not fall under the scope of
the treaty, the fact that these funds can control multinational
corporations also challenges the current interpretations of the concept.
Most investment tribunals have considered a legal person as a foreign
national according to its place of "incorporation or the main seat of the
business."46 This reasoning incentivizes companies to restructure their
investment planning so that they are protected under a BIT.1 47 The
states have condemned the treaty shopping practice, but tribunals have
reacted to the critique in contradictory terms.14 Suffice it to say that the
majority of the tribunals have considered it valid and have avoided
piercing the corporate veil to see who is the ultimate controller of the
investment.14 9 This inconsistency of the doctrine is exacerbated by the
challenge brought to the investment regime of having a sovereign
wealth fund investing heavily in a foreign company. A company with
such characteristics might be considered as a national of the state where
it was incorporated (i.e., Canada for NEXEN), regardless if behind it
there is a sovereign wealth fund or a state-owned company (i.e.,
China's interests in NEXEN).
The same happens with many Chinese state-owned companies.
On one side, they look like capitalist companies seeking rent
opportunities abroad, but on the other, they are constrained by the
Party's interests.' Even if the veil is pierced, there might be no
seeming presence of the state behind it-but in fact, these corporations
144. Id. at 171.
145. Id. at 167.
146. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 85, at 49.
147. Id. at 54-55.
148. Id.
149. McLACHLAN, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 61, at 144-48.
150. McGREGOR, supra note 133, at 49-54.
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are limited by Party politics. In the words of a Chinese corporate
lawyer: "In corporate law, the boards [of Chinese state companies] can
choose to disregard the Party's advice. As a fact of life, they cannot.""'
Some members of the U.S. government see the Chinese
expansion in investment as a national security issue.'5 2 For these
"jealous" policymakers, the Chinese sovereign wealth fund that owns
most of the public debt of a country could jeopardize America's
economic security. '" This influence on government debt does not mean
that it is in the interest of the Chinese to jeopardize the U.S. economy.
In the end, investing in the United States is not done merely to threaten
the United States; depreciating the debt would be equivalent to burning
their own savings just for the sake of affecting the U.S. economy, which
happens to be one of its main trading partners.
At the moment, the United States has handled Chinese investment
by requiring them to pass administrative approval by the Committee of
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).154 CFIUS is tasked
with reviewing any investment "whenever there were national security
implications."5 5 One of the most controversial CFIUS interventions
took place in 2005 when the CNOOC abandoned its intention to
purchase the California-based Unocal after being pressured by
CFIUS.15 6
The U.S. Congress has not stopped there. It gave more powers to
CFIUS. In 2007, it passed the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act not only to include a review of foreign acquisitions on
strategic national security areas but also to supervise the intervention
from sovereign wealth funds in purchases below 10% of the shares, and
even in shares that do not involve voting rights.' Today, CFIJS may
prohibit any transaction "if the infrastructures are strategic and if the
transactions are made by parties controlled, even if only indirectly, by
foreign states.""8 It is hard to see how this process of review would be
allowed under a traditional BIT that includes nondiscrimination, fair
and equitable treatment, and full protection and security provisions. If
the United States maintains its policy, it would have to amend its model
151. Id. at 49.
152. YERGIN, supra note 27, at 205.
153. Bassan, supra note 142, at 185.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Shobert, supra note 139.
157. Bassan, supra note 142, at 185.
158. Id at 185-86.
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BIT to allow the powers invested in CFIUS or to explicitly exclude
certain areas in the United States from Chinese investment. The
problem with this policy is that the Chinese would then have the same
right to exclude U.S. investment from certain areas and subject them to
review from its national agencies, resulting in a backlash from the
opening that the United States has been requesting.15 9 It would be a
setback to the Chinese tendency to open its economy to foreign
investment.
The understanding that the United States and China achieve
regarding these new actors in foreign investment will modify not only
their relationship but also most of the new foreign direct investment in
the world. The fact is that many states, particularly the new emerging
economies, are using this kind of legal entity to expand their investment
abroad.'o Countries like India, Korea, and Malaysia have aggressively
used their reserves to constitute sovereign wealth funds.'6 ' In
addressing them, China and the United States will shape the way
investment law is going to develop in the following decades.
C. The Rise of the Petro-Dragon
In the past two decades, national oil companies (NOCs) have
increased their participation in the oil sector dramatically.'6 2 Of the
twenty top oil-producing companies, more than half-fourteen-are
NOCs.'6 3 Some studies calculate that NOCs control around eighty
percent of the proven world reserves.'" In the case of China, for
example, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has the
fourth-largest oil reserves in the world:'6 5 CNPC operates oil and gas
projects in thirty-five countries worldwide and has a workforce of
1,463,700.166 What makes the Chinese NOCs different from their
counterparts is the fact that the Chinese companies have been willing
to expand internationally in a very aggressive way. CNPC, China
National Petro-Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and CNOOC do not
159. Id. at 187.
160. Id. at 185.
161. Id. at 165.
162. Xu, supra note 32, at 2-4.
163. Id. at 3.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 5.
166. The World's Biggest Oil and Gas Companies in 2018, HYDROCARBONS TECH.
(June 21, 2018), https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/features/worlds-biggest-oil-gas-
companies-2018/.
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stay in their comfort zones (mainly the home states) but have competed
with the major players in securing reserves abroad.'67 CNPC's first
business adventures in the 1990s were to Peru, Sudan, and
Kazakhstan.'68 As stated by other authors, these NOCs are part of a
China Going Abroad agenda orchestrated by the central government.16 9
The rise of the global Petro-Dragon can be explained as a strategy
by the Chinese government o secure access to energy resources for an
expanding economy with a flat domestic supply.' However, the
firsthand control of hydrocarbon resources can also be explained as a
strategy to modify the existing legal regime and tailor it toward Chinese
interests.
The two strategies are not in conflict. Instead, they work in
tandem. An international legal and contractual regime that favors the
Chinese interests ensures that the flow of resources feeds a thirsty
industry"' and expanding middle class in mainland China.'72
Ultimately, this is the same strategy that the Western democracies,
especially the industrialized nations, employed to secure the flow of
trade, natural resources, and capital that would expand the domestic
companies and secure their assets abroad.'7 3 As mentioned in the
previous subparts, the WTO, BITs, and the ICSID regime all worked
in favor of Western global companies at their time of foundation.'74
Now, China is emulating the former exporting capital nations in
creating a regime that protects its interests abroad.'7 5
III. LOOSE DRAGONS IN THE HIGH SEAS
This Part of the Article describes Chinese state-owned companies'
strategy of participating in deepwater fields around the globe. As
mentioned previously, Chinese investments-through state-owned
companies-should not be considered as regular foreign investments.
167. Xu, supra note 32, at 3-4.
168. Id. at 4.
16 9. Id.
170. Id. at 2-3 ("Most analyses of the Chinese quest for overseas energy sources point
to the growing substantial gap between the country's booming demand and its flat supply.
Indeed, the author believes that this divide is the primary force pushing the country to secure
its sustainable oil supply into the future.").
171. Idat3-4.
172. He Wei, Growth of Middle Class Means Major Changes for China, CHINA DAILY,
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-10/02/content_32752727.htm (last updated Oct. 2, 2017).
173. Alvarez, supra note 42, at 5-6.
174. Shaffer & Gao 2019, supra note 16, at 16.
175. Id at 3.
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Chinese investment planning has a long-term horizon, and most
importantly, a geopolitical component."6 It does not matter that the rest
of the international oil companies are abandoning certain areas of the
world due to the short-term price horizons and declining production
rates; the Chinese are investing in those areas because they consider
them strategic for their long-term goals.
This Part also describes the operations of Chinese companies in
the contested South China Sea, in the North Sea, and in the Gulf of
Mexico. It explains how these three areas of investment connect with
one geopolitical goal: to acquire the know-how of the industry, to test
the international norms on the development of shared resources, and to
be at the forefront of contract negotiations dealing with the
development of those areas.
A. Dragons in Transboundary Fields: The North Sea and the
Cameroon-Nigeria Maritime Boundary
In its effort to acquire a foothold in the U.S. oil and gas industry,
discussed in detail in Part II.C above, CNOOC purchased a large
Canadian oil and gas company, Nexen.i7 Nexen has recently increased
its operations in the North Sea and is now the operator of the Buzzard,
Golden Eagle, and Scott platforms."' The significant investment of
CNOOC makes it the largest producer in the area.'79 This fact in and of
itself has raised flags in the business community since the North Sea is
considered to be a depleting area of investment.'"0 The decrease in oil
prices, the development stage of most of the fields, and the dwindling
reserves make the North Sea an area where most big international
companies are phasing out-with the exception of CNOOC."'
CNOOC, through its Nexen subsidiary, recently received
approval from the United Kingdom's Oil and Gas Authority for a
second development plan in the United Kingdom's largest producing
176. See Brown, supra note 16.
177. Euan Rocha, CNOOC Closes $15.1 Billion Acquisition of Canada's Nexen,
REUTERS, Feb. 25, 2013, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nexen-cnooc/cnooc-
closes-I 5-1-billion-acquisition-of-canadas-nexen-idUSBRE910 A420130225.
178. Coleman, supra note 3; Operations: UK, CNOOC INT'L LTD., https://intl.cnoocltd.
com/operations/Europe/uk (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
179. Lianna Brinded, China Has Taken Over Scotland's North Sea Oil Production,
Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-cnooc-largest-oil-
operator-in-scotlands-north-sea-2016-8.
180. Mostrous, supra note 2.
181. Brinded, supra note 179.
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oil field, Buzzard.182 With the second stage of investment, Nexen is
planning to avert the steep decline of Buzzard, which was producing
around 140,000 barrels a day (b/d) in early 2018, down from peaks of
220,000 b/d.'" The second stage is projected to begin production in
2021 and is expected to increase overall reserves by 26.2 million-55.2
million barrels of oil. 18 4 Nexen's acreage also includes fields in the
borderland with Norway that, if found as containing transboundary
resources, would trigger the U.K.-Norway Framework Agreement for
transboundary resources.
Chinese state-owned companies have also invested heavily in the
Cameroon-Nigeria borderline. Since 2012, Addax Petroleum, a
subsidiary of the Chinese state-owned company Sinopec, acquired a
concession right to Block 123 on the Nigerian side of the border.18 6
Block 123 is not only the most important asset in Nigeria owned by
Addax Petroleum, allowing the company to produce 300 million
barrels (mmbbls) in 2014, but it also straddles the borderline with
Cameroon.'17
Consistent with the Chinese strategy of participating in
transboundary exploitation, in 2012, Addax Petroleum acquired a
license from the Cameroonian government to develop Iroko-a field
located across the border from Block 123.8'8 With the control of blocks
on both sides of the maritime borderline, the Chinese state-owned
company has a front seat in the negotiations between Cameroon and
Nigeria on how to develop transboundary fields. It can propose a
unitization agreement, set up environmental and safety standards, and
test both of them with the local authorities.
182. Coleman, supra note 3.
18 3. Id.
184. Id.
185. Peter D. Cameron, The Rules of Engagement: Developing Cross-Border
Petroleum Deposits in the North Sea and the Caribbean, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 559, 571-72
(2006); Nexen Inc. Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 8 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/16873/0001104
65912012059/al2-5169 140fhtm#TableOfContents.
186. See Addax Petroleum to Complete OML 123 Development, NAIRAMETRICS
(May 27, 2015), https://nairametrics.com/2015/05/27/addax-petroleum-to-complete-oml-123-
development/ (detailing Addax's commitment to Block 123 oil production).
187. Addax Highlights Production Gains from OML 123, ENERGY MIX REPORT (May
27,2015), https://www.energymixreport.com/addax-highlights-production-gains-from-oml-123/.
188. See Cameroon: Addax Petroleum Announces Oil and Gas Discovery at the
Padouk-1X Well, Iroko Block Cameroon, ENERGY-PEDIA NEWS (Oct. 9, 2012), https://www.
energy-pedia.com/news/cameroon/new- 151972.
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B. Dragons in the South China Sea
The South China Sea is estimated to contain considerable
amounts of hydrocarbon reservoirs.' Some Chinese estimates have
listed potential oil reservoirs around 213 billion barrels of oil, and the
U.S. Geological Survey estimates roughly 266 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas.'90
In 2014, CNOOC drilled a section of the maritime contested area
with Vietnam, the Chinese State argued that the fields were located
within its "sovereign territory." 9 ' CNOOC's $1 billion deepwater
drilling rig, Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY 981), "straddled two
hydrocarbon blocks . .. that Hanoi had previously demarcated but not
yet developed."'92
Due to Vietnamese military and U.S. diplomatic pressure,
including the deployment of twenty-nine armed Vietnamese vessels
and deadly riots against Chinese companies in Vietnam, the rig was
removed in 2015, but the Chinese did so arguing that the decision was
taken "in accordance with relevant company's plan" and not due to
"external factor[s]."'93 Since then, HYSY 981 has been deployed again
in contested waters in the South China Sea where there is an overlap
between the two continental shelves of Vietnam and the Chinese island
of Hainan.194




191. Id; see also Michael Green et al., Counter-Coercion Series: China-Vietnam Oil
Rig Standoff ASIA MAR. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (June 12, 2017), https:/amti.csis.org/
counter-co-oil-rig-standoff/ (discussing China-Vietnam tensions over CNOOC rig in disputed
territory).
192. Green et al., supra note 191; Kate Hodal, Despite Oil Rig Removal, China and
Vietnam Row Still Simmers, GUARDIAN (July 17, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/jul/17/oil-rig-china-vietnam-row-south-china-sea.
193. Hodal, supra note 192 (quoting Hong Lei, Spokesperson, Chinese Foreign
Ministry, Further Remarks Concerning the Withdrawal of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig (July
16,2014), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa-eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401?t1175131.shtml);
see also Jane Perlez, Chinese Oil Rig Near Vietnam to Be Moved, N.Y. TIMEs (July 15, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/world/asia/chinese-oil-rig-near-vietnam-to-be-moved.
html (discussing further the HYSY 981 incident).
194. Mike Ives, Vietnam Objects to Chinese Oil Rig in Disputed Waters, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/world/asia/south-china-sea-vietnam-
china.html.
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C. Dragons in the GulfofMexico
Since the 2000s, China has continuously attempted to establish a
foothold in the Gulf of Mexico.19 5 The first effort took place in 2005,
when CNOOC tried to buy the U.S. independent company Unocal,
which had a substantial interest in fields located in the Gulf of
Mexico.196 Much of its U.S. production was located in the Gulf.197 In a
few words, the Chinese were trying to enter the deepwater fields in U.S.
territorial waters.'9 8 At that time, CNOOC's billion-dollar financial
battle to acquire Unocal was seen by some Chinese officials as
"disconcerting."'99 It was the first time a Chinese energy-related state-
owned company had entered the U.S. market in such an aggressive
way.200 In the end, CNOOC's bid to buy Unocal failed--Chevron
acquired Unocal for $17.3 billion-but the effort rang the bells in
Washington, D.C.2 0 '
China's effort to participate in the U.S. energy market was viewed
with hostility by law and policymakers.2 0 2 CNOOC's bidding of
Unocal "became the focus of a firestorm of anti-Chinese sentiment on
Capitol Hill that was already supercharged by the contentious hot-
button issues of trade, currencies, and jobs."2 03 The reaction "showed
the intensity, at least in some quarters, of suspicions of China's motives
and methods."20 What became evident from this first experience was
that "the United States itself was less hospitable to the openness toward
foreign investment that it preached to others."205 Moreover, for the
195. YERGIN, supra note 27, at 204-05.
19 6. Id.
197. Id at 205 ("Unocal's entire production in the United States amounted to just 1
percent of the total U.S. output. Much of it was in the Gulf of Mexico, in joint ventures with
other companies, and the only market for that output was the United States.").
198. See id. at 204-05.
199. Id. at 204 ("For some in Beijing, a global takeover battle was not only unfamiliar
but disconcerting. The price that CNOOC put on the table was greater than the entire cost of
the huge Three Gorges Dam project, which had taken decades to build.").
200. See generally id at 205 (noting the United States was inhospitable to the idea of
new Chinese investments).
201. YERGIN, supra note 27, at 205 ("But in the course of [the] takeover battle, a fiery
political controversy erupted in Washington that was out of scale compared with the issues. ...
[I]t was 'like throwing a match into a room filled with gasoline."').
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. As Yergin observes, "One critic told a congressional committee... that
CNOOC's bid was part of China's strategy for 'domination of energy markets and of the
Western Pacific." Id. (quoting UNOCAL Hearing, supra note 39, at 6).
205. Id. ("Whatever the specifics of the takeover battle, the takeaway for the Chinese at
the end of the political battle was that the United States itself was less hospitable to the
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West, it was evidence that Chinese companies had changed.20 6 They
were no longer focused on building their internal infrastructure and
developing their petroleum practice at the local level; rather, they had
the financial capacity to participate in the world market.2 07 People
started to see CNOOC no longer as a regional state-owned company
but as a global player with ambitions in the West.208
CNOOC's second effort to gain a foothold in U.S. oil and gas
production in the Gulf of Mexico took place seven years later when it
bought a large Canadian oil and gas company, Nexen.2 09 Instead of
entering the U.S. market directly, by buying Nexen for $15.1 billion,
CNOOC acquired the Canadian interests in several fields located in the
Gulf of Mexico.210
Today, Nexen holds a 25% nonoperating working interest in
Stampede, which is located 160 miles off the coast of Louisiana.2 11
Stampede is in 3500 feet of water and is expected to produce 300-350
million barrels of recoverable oil. 2 12 Nexen also holds a 21%
nonoperating working interest in Appomattox, located about eighty
miles off the coast of Louisiana in over 7000 feet of water.2 13 This field
is operated by Shell Gulf of Mexico and is estimated to contain 700
million barrels of oil.2 14 Appomattox is located a few miles from
Nexen's other nonoperated fields in the Gulf of Mexico: Vicksburg,
Gettysburg, and Rydberg.2 15
openness toward foreign investment that it preached to others and that the Chinese companies
should redouble their investment effort-but elsewhere.").
206. Id.
207. Id. at 206-07.
208. Id. at 205 ("The world was shocked that a Chinese company could make this kind
of bid,' said Fu Chengyu, at the time the CEO of CNOOC. 'The West was saying that China
is changing in terms of such things as building highways. But it was not paying attention to
China itself and how China had changed.").
209. Claudia Cattaneo, China's CNOOC to Buy Nexen for $15. 1-Billion, FIN. POST (July
23, 2012, 7:19 AM), https://business.financialpost.com/commodities/energy/chinas-cnooc-
to-buy-nexen-for- 15-1-billion.
210. Id.
211. Operations: United States, CNOOC INT'L LTD., https://intl.cnoocltd.com/en/
operations/americas/united-states (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
212. Irina Slav, China's Nexen Prepares to Pull Out of U.S. GulfofMexico, OILPRICE.
Com (Sept. 27, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/China-
Nexen-Prepares-To-Pull-Out-Of-US-Gulf-Of-Mexico.html.
213. Id.
214. First Oilfrom Stampede, CNOOC INT'L LTD., https://intl.cnoocltd.com/en/related-
content/united-states/first-oil-from-stampede (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
215. Id
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In addition to the fields operated by Nexen directly, the Canadian-
based company also manages exploration and working interests on
behalf of CNOOC in four Statoil-operated offshore prospects in the
Gulf of Mexico: Krakatoa, Logan, Cobra, and Tucker.2 16 These fields
are located close to the sea borderline with Mexico in the Alaminos
Canyon.2 17 For example, Cobra lies 132 miles from the nearest Texas
shoreline in 7684 feet of water, and it is four blocks away from the
borderline and one block away from Gotcha, Great White, and
Trident-three fields that have been signaled out as containing possible
transboundary fields.2 18
On the Mexican side, CNOOC entered the deep waters of the Gulf
aggressively in 2016.219 During Mexico's first deepwater auction,
CNOOC was awarded two fields after bidding aggressively.220
CNOOC's bids were done single-handedly and "were not only above
the tender's average, but in the case of one block, it offered an
additional royalty rate of 17.01 percent, 2.5 times higher than the
second highest bidder and 5 times higher than the minimum rate
demanded by the government."22 1 In other words, CNOOC put
everything on the table to secure that block. Only PEMEX, Mexico's
state-owned company, presented a competing offer with an additional
royalty of 6.65%.222 Below is the official summary of the tendering
process published by the Mexican National Hydrocarbons
Commission showing the bid presented by CNOOC and the second
behind it.223
216. CNOOC Dives into Gulf of Mexico, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.
china.org.cn/business/2009-11/06/content_18838035.htm; Sanati, supra note 12.
217. Sanati, supra note 12.
218. Id.
219. Zheng Xin, China Buys Two Blocks in Oil Auction, CHINA DAILY, www.china
daily.com.cn/business/2016-12/08/content_27606694.htm (last updated Dec. 8,2016, 8:17 AM).
220. Mohar, supra note 4.
221. Id.
222. China Buys Mexico Offshore Oil Rights, CHINA EcON. REV. (Dec. 6, 2016),
chinaeconomicreview.com/china-buys-mexico-offshore-oil-rights/.
223. Ronda 1-Licitacion 4, COMIsioN NACIONAL DE HIDROCARBUROS 1, web.archive.
org/web/20170610230203/https://rondasmexico.gob.mx/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ARI-
CPP.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
346 [Vol. 94:313
202] OOIPJINT OF 7171 VH~S 34'()IRGO 7
would CNOOCbA rnore than s lock that
all o ms an ur f Iswe




8TL / - LA WV RE I V 13E
In other words, CNOOC , as the single operator in the field, will
have a front seat to the negotiations between Mexico and the United
States that will determine the model contracts and safety and
environmental regulations that will guide the exploitation of the field.
CNOOC's effort to secure blocks near the border was confirmed a year
later when, in the bidding round two of the Mexican energy reform,
China again single-handedly offered an additional royalty of 11.45%
for a borderline field, but lost against Shell and Pemex's joint offer of
15J02%2 "' and a cash payment of $343 million. 228 Shell outbid CNOOC
because it is operating a field right across the border with the United
States: Whale 22 9~ According to information disclosed after the Mexican
auction, Shell had recovered information on Whale that allowed it to
calculate that the field will enable the international oil company to
227. Borrda et a nspra note 10, at 2.
228. Ron Btousso &e Marianna Panraga, Hiow Shell Hid a Whale Befre Placingr Mexican
Oil Bet, RE UTERSi. Mar. 2, 201 8 aail at https://ukreutcecorn'article/us-ceraweek-she 1
reserves/how-shell-h d-a-w ha e-before-placing-mexicani-oi I-bei tiKKCN IGEGI (2.
229. Id
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recover 700 million barrels of oil, around half of Shell's 2017 oil
production.230
IV. AN IMPERFECT UNION: U.S-MEXICO TREATY ON
TRANSBOUNDARY HYDROCARBONS EXPLOITATION
As discussed in the Introduction, the United States and Mexico
signed an international treaty in 2012 that set principles for the safe and
efficient exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon resources in the
Gulf of Mexico.231' The 2012 Treaty faced several obstacles during its
fourteen years of negotiation: Mexico's closed legislation to foreign
investment in the energy sector, electoral cycles in both nations, U.S.
exceptionalism regarding its relationship to the laws of the sea, the
adoption of Dodd-Frank legislation in the United States impacting oil
companies, and the Mexican state-owned company's (PEMEX) lack of
sophistication, among others.232 All of these challenges prevented the
United States and Mexico from reaching an earlier deal and from
adopting a comprehensive agreement.233 The three main factors that
were unanswered and that have an impact on the United States and
Mexico's practice on the development of transboundary resources-
and for that matter, on the way customary international law on the
subject evolves-are the following: the possibility for unilateral
exploitation of the fields, the absence of a binding and clear dispute
resolution mechanism, and the treatment of foreign investment in the
development zones.
The following subparts will deal explicitly with these three factors
and describe how they can set a precedent for the Chinese development
of the South China Sea.
230. Id.
231. See 2012 Treaty, supra note 5.
232. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 747-52.
233. For earlier work describing the challenges to reach an agreement, see Miriam
Grunstein, Unitized We Stand, Divided We Fall: A Mexican Response to Karla Urdaneta's
Analysis of Transboundary Petroleum Reservoirs in the Deep Waters of the Gulf of Mexico,
33 Hous. J. INT'L L. 345 (2011); Karla Urdaneta, Transboundary Petroleum Reservoirs: A
Recommended Approach for the United States and Mexico in the Deepwaters of the Gulf of
Mexico, 32 Hous. J. INT'L L. 333 (2010).
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A. Unitization i la Carte
The principle of unitization is relatively simple to define.2 34
Unitization entails treating a hydrocarbon field that trespasses two
blocks, or maritime boundaries, as a unit for its development.2 3 5 As
described by a leading scholar in the field, "Unitization is the joint,
coordinated operation of a petroleum reservoir by all the owners of
rights in the separate tracts overlying the reservoir."23 6 The reason
behind it is also relatively simple to grasp. If each side treats the
reservoir differently, there is a risk of collapsing the field and affecting
each other's property, or at the minimum of extracting the resources
that belong to the neighboring operator. In a few words, unitization is a
"method of producing oil and gas efficiently and fairly" for the benefit
of both parties.237
Unitization as such is an international law principle that evolves
from the customary norm of respecting the rights of neighboring
nations to exploit their natural resources.238 Now, commentators have
been reluctant to recognize that unitization is a customary norm that
must be followed always.23 9 However, they acknowledge that states
must exercise restraint from extracting resources that do not belong to
234. Jacqueline Lang Weaver & David F. Asmus, Unitizing Oil and Gas Fields Around
the World: A Comparative Analysis ofNational Laws andPrivate Contracts, 28 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 3, 6 (2006).
235. Id. at 6-7.
236. Id. at 6.
237. Id at 11.
238. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), at 15-16 (Dec. 14,1962) ("The right of peoples and nations
to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the
interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned
. . . . The free and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural
resources must be furthered by the mutual respect of States based on their sovereign equality.
... Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and hinders
the development of international co-operation and the maintenance of peace."); see also G.A.
Res. 3281 (XXIX), art. 3 (Dec. 12, 1974) (calling for co-operation in order to achieve optimum
use of resources between countries); G.A. Res. 3129 (XXVIII), at 49 (Dec. 13, 1973)
("Considers that it is necessary to ensure effective co-operation between countries through the
establishment of adequate international standards for the conservation and harmonious
exploitation of natural resources common to two or more States in the context of the normal
relations existing between them .... Considers further that co-operation between countries
sharing such natural resources and interested in their exploitation must be developed on the
basis of a system of information and prior consultation within the framework of the normal
relations existing between them.").
239. Cameron, supra note 185, at 560-61.
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them, even if these are in areas where both nations have a contested
right to exploit them.2 40
Putting it in colloquial terms, neighbors should respect each
other's common oil fields and negotiate in good faith, but there is no
clear rule on how to jointly exploit them.24 1 Mexico and the United
States accepted this international norm in the 2012 Treaty preamble,
where they recognized the "principles that promote equitable and
reasonable utilization of transboundary resources, and desir[e] to
maximize the long term benefits from their exploitation, as well as to
protect the resources of both Parties."24 2 Moreover, they stated that the
goal of the 2012 Treaty was to "establish a legal framework to achieve
safe, efficient, equitable and environmentally responsible exploitation
of transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs that may exist along the
maritime boundaries."24 3 In order to achieve these goals, the 2012
Treaty is "intended to encourage the establishment of cooperative
arrangements based primarily on principles of unitization." 24 4
Notwithstanding the recognition of each other's rights to develop
the resources in accordance with international law, the United States
and Mexico also deviated from international practice in substantial
terms. First and foremost, the 2012 Treaty allows the operators to
initiate production unilaterally if after a period of negotiation the
interested parties cannot reach a unitization agreement.24 5
The negotiation process set up by the 2012 Treaty is less than
adequate. It involves several deadlines with default rules of rejection
and requires the consent of both governments' Executive Agencies and
their licensees.24 6 If the governments do not approve the proposed
unitization agreements within ninety days of being presented, the issue
is referred to a Joint Commission that, for the reasons explained in
240. William T. Onorato, Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum
Deposit, 26 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 324, 328 (1977) ("[I]t is evident that unconsented, unilateral
exploitation of an international common petroleum deposit by an interested State is unlawful
under existing international law.").
241. Cameron, supra note 185, at 560-61.
242. 2012 Treaty, supra note 5, pmbl.; see Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 5, at
752-55.
243. 2012 Treaty, supra note 5, pmbl.
244. Id.
245. Id. art. 7(4) ("If no unitization agreement and associated Unit Operating Agreement
has been approved within 90 days of submission of the issue to the Joint Commission,
Exploitation of the Transboundary Reservoir may proceed pursuant to paragraph 5 of this
Article.").
246. Id
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further detail below, is structurally deficient in resolving disputes.247
According to Article 7 of the 2012 Treaty, if no agreement has been
approved by the governments or signed by the licensees after the Joint
Commission fails to resolve the issue, "each Party may authorize its
Licensee to proceed with Exploitation of the relevant Transboundary
Reservoir subject to the determination of the recoverable
Hydrocarbons."2 48 In sum, the 2012 Treaty sets up a mechanism of
negotiation that-far from ensuring Mexico and the United States
develop their resources in an efficient, transparent, and effective way-
configures a tortuous process with high chances for one of the parties
to initiate production unilaterally. Ultimately, the 2012 Treaty only
requires a licensee and/or a government authority to reject any proposal
for 120 days.2 49 After that period, the licensee is entitled to develop the
field unilaterally only subject to respecting the determination of
production (the percentage of oil belonging to each side). The 2012
Treaty provision, as such, in principle defies customary international
law that prevents parties from unilaterally exploiting transboundary
resources.2 50
Second, the scope of the agreement's obligation does not apply to
any license awarded before the entry into force of the 2012 Treaty.2 5 1
Article 1 explicitly excludes "any License existing as of the date of'
the 2012 Treaty's entry into force.2 52 Since Mexico did not have any
license in the maritime borderline at the time of the 2012 Treaty's entry
247. Id. art. 4.
248. Id. art. 7(5) ("Should any Party or Licensee fail to sign a unitization agreement or
Unit Operating Agreement, as applicable, approved by the Executive Agencies or the Joint
Commission within 60 days of its approval, or should the Executive Agencies or the Joint
Commission fail to approve a unitization agreement and an associated Unit Operating
Agreement, each Party may authorize its Licensee to proceed with Exploitation of the relevant
Transboundary Reservoir subject to the determination of the recoverable Hydrocarbons
pursuant to paragraph 2 subparagraph b or paragraph 3 of this Article and any plan for joint
management of the Transboundary Reservoir, including any provisions agreed governing
redetermination and metering, as may be agreed between the Parties. Such plan may contain
provisions for the resolution of disputes pursuant to Article 16. In the event of such
Exploitation, Parties will exchange production data on a monthly basis.").
249. Id. art. 7(4)-(5).
250. See Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 683.
251. 2012 Treaty, supra note 5, art. 1 ("If any provision in this Agreement would require
a Party to alter the terms of any License existing as of the date of the last notification provided
under Article 22, such provision shall not apply in such case. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
the Parties recognize that it is in their interest that such Licenses be subject to all terms of this
Agreement, and shall undertake good faith efforts to bring those Licenses under this
Agreement.").
252. Id art. 1.
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into force, this provision m as that the U1S. governnment would not
conmnit itself to force eisting be ensees to adapt to the 2012 Treat
proisions, paricularly the univzation obli ation fhe US
government only committed to "undertake good ith efforts to brig
those Licenses under th[e] Agreement ." Ti e Department of the
Interior has recognized that there are licensed fields in the existing
maritime borderIne that have potential trasboundary resources and
that would not fall under the scope of the 2012 Tiety-
Moreover, the U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Ocean
Energy Manag ment (BOELM) confi ed that the nine active leases of
pre-Areement 1icensees were offered the opportu to "opt-in" to the
terms of the Agreement but did not accept the offer. iternational oil
companies such as Chevron, Shell, BP, Stone Enery, and Rocksource
Guil of Mexico hold these leases.' Below is a map presented by a
1O)M 1 officer on the tansboundary agreement showing the active
lease that are suiject to the 2012 Tre and those that are not:
Figure 4258
Transbounndar Area
estern and ntral Planning Areas
253 See Sanchez & McLaughln, pr ote 5, at 684 (explaining how production areas
have typically been far rom maritime boundaries).
254. 2012 Treaty,'supra note 5, art. 1.
255. Robert L. Sebastian, Status of US. Policies: Leasing and Developing




258. Sebaian sipra note 255, at 22
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It is precisely the excluded area that contains most of the current
Perdido's oil production. Since coming onstream, that area has
produced about 100 million barrels of oil equivalent (MMboe), and its
estimated recoverable reserves are 500 MMboe.2 59
In addition to the pre-agreement leases, BOEM has awarded
twenty-seven leases in blocks within the transboundary area (Sales 233
and 238).260 These included high bids of $21,333,850 and $28,059,734,
respectively, by international oil companies such as Exxon Mobil, BP,
BHP, and Stone Energy.261
In conclusion, the 2012 Treaty recognizes international customary
international law in its preamble, but in practice does not follow the
spirit of the rule.262 The 2012 Treaty sets up procedures to foster
unitization but allows unilateral exploitation in case the negotiations
fail.263 Moreover, it does not force existing licensees to implement the
most important obligation of the Agreement. The 2012 Treaty as such
is the first effort to exploit the resources efficiently for the benefit of
both nations but leaves plenty of doors open for the parties to act
unilaterally. The reluctance to force the parties to continue negotiations
or bind themselves to a final decision is a recurrent theme of the 2012
Treaty obligations. The ultimate result of the Agreement is that the
parties are forced to engage in conversations about unitization, and as
such are mildly better off with the existing treaty than without one.
However, they are not obligated to continue the negotiations
indefinitely.26
If the United States would like to send a message to China that the
resources in the South China Sea should be developed under
international law, keeping the parties at the negotiation table until they
find a way to exploit their resources jointly and equitably, the 2012
Treaty is not a good example. To the contrary, the U.S.-Mexico
example incentivizes China to start producing fields in contested areas,
even if it eventually is willing to sign an agreement o develop them
jointly with its neighbors. If the rule to follow is the one set by the 2012
Treaty, China would either need to compensate its neighbors for the
259. Anne Leonard & Tom Liskey, Drilling Picks Up Across the Perdido Foldbelt,
OFFSHORE MAG. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.offshore-mag.com/drilling-completion/article/
16754984/drilling-picks-up-across-the-perdido-foldbelt.
260. Sebastian, supra note 255, at 18-19.
261 Id
262. 2012 Treaty, supra note 5, pmbl., art. 4-5.
263. Id. art. 6, 7(5).
264. See id. art. 7(5).
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extracted resources or modify the awarded concessions to reflect a
unitization principle.
B. The Dispute Resolution Gap
Chapter five of the 2012 Treaty, entitled "Settlement of Disputes,"
comes nowhere close to setting an efficient method to resolve the
disputes arising from the 2012 Treaty's implementation. Chapter five
contains three methods available to resolve disputes arising from the
2012 Treaty: consultations/mediation, expert determination, and
arbitration.265 Chapter five then divides the types of disputes into two
categories: those related to the interpretation and implementation of the
agreement, and those pertaining to expert determination.26 6 Each of
these will be analyzed in the next subparts.
The 2012 Treaty also creates a Joint Commission in charge of
"administering" the agreement.2 67 The Joint Commission serves as the
initial interpreter of the 2012 Treaty, as the initial mediator for the
allocation of production and as the body in charge of enacting dispute
resolution procedures, including rules to appoint experts for the
determination and allocation of production, and those related to the
arbitration procedures.2 68  Moreover, the Joint Commission is
empowered to establish working groups with experts and to seek
advice from nongovernmental organizations and individuals to fulfill
its mission.2 6 9
265. Id. art. 15, 16, 17.
266. Id art. 15.
267. Id art. 14(1).
268. Id art. 8(3) ("If the Executive Agencies are unable to reach agreement on this
initial allocation of production within 30 days from the date of the initiation of consultations in
accordance with paragraph I of this Article, the matter shall be addressed by the Joint
Commission."); id art. 14(5)-(6) ("The Joint Commission shall be the competent body to
examine any dispute or other matter referred to it by either Executive Agency relating to the
interpretation and implementation of this Agreement, or any unforeseen issues arising under
this Agreement. . .. If the Joint Commission is unable within 60 days to resolve all differences
concerning the allocation of production pursuant to Article 8, or the reallocation of production
pursuant o Article 9, either Party may submit the dispute for Expert Determination."); id. art.
16(1) ("The Joint Commission shall, within 180 days of the adoption of its rules of procedure,
establish arrangements for the appointment of the expert and terms of engagement, including,
in particular, provisions governing compensation and the protection of confidentiality."); id.
art. 17 ("If any dispute regarding the interpretation and implementation of this Agreement that
is not subject to Expert Determination cannot be resolved by the Joint Commission or through
consultations, either Party may submit the dispute to arbitration. The Joint Commission shall,
within 180 days of the adoption of its rules of procedure, establish an arbitration mechanism
for the implementation of this Article.").
269. Id. art. 14(2)-(3).
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Even though the creation of a Joint Commission was a positive
step toward the implementation of the 2012 Treaty, the way it was
created raises several questions about its ability to successfully exercise
its functions.270 The first challenge that the Joint Commission faces is
the fact that it is composed only of two individuals, each appointed by
the government agencies representing the states in the 2012 Treaty.27'
The Joint Commission does not have any financial or technical
autonomy to fulfill its mission.27 2 The 2012 Treaty clarifies explicitly
that each government shall support their representative with the
assistance, including experts, that it deems necessary.27 3 As such, the
Joint Commission operates more like a consultation mechanism
between governments than an actual independent body that is in charge
of implementing the treaty.
1. Expert Determination
The expert determination is solely connected to resolving disputes
regarding the determination of the existence of a transboundary
reservoir and the allocation/reallocation of production according to the
transboundary reservoir.274 That is, if Mexico and the United States,
through the Joint Commission, cannot agree on how much output
should be allocated to each side of the border, the parties may submit
the dispute to an expert who shall determine the allocation.2 75
According to Article 16, "Determinations of the expert shall be final
and binding on the Parties."2 7 6
As such, regardless of the other type of disputes, both nations will
be able to determine how much of the resources belong to each party.
However, Article 16 is silent with regard to the methods of production,
the unitization contract, the distribution of responsibilities, and
liabilities among the operators and the government agencies.2 77 The
expert determination is exclusively binding and final regarding the
270. For a detailed analysis of the U.S.-Mexico binational practice in creating
commissions to resolve their disputes, see Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 726-33.
271. 2012 Treaty, supra note 5, art. 14(2) ("Each Party, through its Executive Agency,
shall appoint one representative and one alternate representative to the Joint Commission. Each
Party may provide assistance, including experts, to its representative as it deems necessary.").
272. Id. art. 14(1).
273. Id. art. 14(2).
274. Id. art. 14(6).
275. Id. art. 8(3), 14, 16.
276. Id art. 16(9).
277. Id ("Determinations of the expert shall be final and binding on the Parties.").
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determination and allocation of production.2 78 All other mentioned
issues are to be resolved through other dispute resolution mechanisms.
2. Consultation/Mediation
The initial method of resolving disputes on the interpretation and
implementation of the Agreement is consultation.2 79 The governments
"may initiate consultations through a written request to the other
Party."280 If the governments cannot resolve the disagreement within
120 days of the delivery of the request, "either Party may refer the
disagreement to arbitration."281 However, Mexico and the United States
may also agree to submit the dispute to nonbinding mediation by a
neutral third party "in addition to, or in lieu of' the arbitral
proceedings.2 82 As such, the parties could be facing parallel
proceedings to resolve the 2012 Treaty-related disputes: arbitration and
nonbinding mediation. The only exceptions to this process are those
disputes related to the determination and allocation of production.2 83 As
mentioned above, issues related to the determination and distribution
of production may be submitted to an expert if after 120 days the parties
could not resolve their disagreements.284
3. Arbitration
What generally distinguishes international arbitration from other
dispute resolution mechanisms is the fact that the arbitral process and
the award are binding and final.285 Without these two elements, the
arbitral process assimilates to mediation or conciliation, and the
process will not qualify for the pro-enforcement safeguards provided
by international treaties.286 As stated by a leading scholar in the
27 8. Id.
279. Id. art. 15(1) ("The Parties shall make every effort to resolve any disagreement
relating to the interpretation and implementation of this Agreement through consultations as
rapidly as possible. Either Party may initiate consultations through a written request o the other
Party. Unless the Parties otherwise agree, the Parties shall consult within 20 days of delivery
of the request.").
280. Id.
281. Id art. 15(2) ("If the Parties do not resolve a disagreement hat is not subject to
Expert Determination within 120 days of the delivery of the request for consultations, either
Party may refer the disagreement to arbitration pursuant to Article 17 within 30 days.").
282. Id art. 15(3).
283. Id. art. 15(2).
284. Id.
285. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 204-05 (2d ed. 2014).
286. Id. at 204.
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arbitration field, parties "should not treat arbitration as a possible future
option, applicable only if the parties so agree after a dispute arises.....
[A]rbitration clauses should (and usually do) provide that 'all disputes
shall be finally resolved by arbitration."28 7 That is not the case with
Mexico's and the United States' treatment of the arbitration clause in
the 2012 Treaty. The arbitration provision in the Agreement
exemplifies a disposition that generates more ambiguity to the
resolution of the dispute than actually helping the parties to reach a final
binding solution.
Article 17 states that "[i]f any dispute regarding the interpretation
and implementation of this Agreement that is not subject to Expert
Determination cannot be resolved by the Joint Commission or through
consultations, either Party may submit the dispute to arbitration. "288
Consequently, the arbitration clause has three considerable flaws: (1) it
does not determine the procedure, rules, or the methods of appointment
of the arbitrators; (2) the parties did not express their consent in the
clause to make the proceeding binding; and (3) the provision does not
treat the arbitral award as binding and final upon the Parties.2 89
Moreover, the 2012 Treaty leaves to the Joint Commission the
decision on whether the award will be followed or not.290 It expressly
establishes that "[t]he Joint Commission will have 30 days in which to
consider the final recommendation in any arbitration."2 91 In case the
Joint Commission disagrees with the recommendations and/or is
"unable to resolve any remaining differences within that time, the
dispute will be returned to the Parties."2 9 2 In other words, the arbitration
award serves as a recommendation to the Joint Commission on how to
287. Id at 204-05 (quoting GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM
SELECTION AGREEMENTS; DRAFTING AND ENFORCING (5th ed. 2016)).
288. 2012 Treaty, supra note 5, art. 17 (emphasis added).
289. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 762.
290. 2012 Treaty, supra note 5, art. 14(7).
291. Id.
292. Id. ("If the Joint Commission is unable within 60 days to resolve all differences
concerning any dispute referred to it by the Executive Agencies relating to the interpretation
and implementation of this Agreement that is not addressed in paragraph 6 of this Article
[expert determination] or referred to it under paragraphs 4 or 5 of Article 6 [the approval of
unitization agreements] or paragraph 4 of Article 7 [exploitation of the transboundary reservoir
in case no unitization agreement is approved or signed], either Party may resort to the dispute
settlement provisions in Articles 15 or 17. The Joint Commission will have 30 days in which
to consider the final recommendation in any arbitration instituted pursuant to Article 17. If the
Joint Commission is unable to resolve any remaining differences within that time, the dispute
will be returned to the Parties.").
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resolve the dispute, and it is up to the commissioners to consider it or
send their differences back to the government representatives.
When compared to other transboundary resources treaties, the
2012 Treaty's atypical dispute resolution mechanism becomes clearer.
For example, instead of the "may submit to arbitration" language
contained in the 2012 Treaty,2 93 the practice is to include language that
makes the proceeding binding. The Iceland-Norway Agreement of
2008, the Norway-UK Frigg Agreement of 1978, and the Australia-
Indonesia Timor Gap Treaty make arbitration mandatory by stating that
the dispute "shall be submitted" to arbitration ("referred to" in the case
of the Netherlands-Germany Treaty and the Korea-Japan) if the parties
cannot reach an agreement.2 94 Furthermore, the practice in other treaties
is to ensure that the award is final and binding: "[a]n award shall be
final and binding on Australia and Timor-Leste";29 5 "[t]he decisions of
the tribunal shall be binding";296 or "[t]he Parties shall abide by any
award made by the arbitration board under this article."2 97 There is no
option for the parties to "consider" the recommendations of the
arbitration panel as the 2012 Treaty allows in Article 14(7).298
C. Foreign Direct Investment Protection and Challenges at the
Borderline
Critical questions on the application of foreign investment
protection mechanisms are at play in the implementation of the 2012
293. Id. art. 15(2).
294. Agreement Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits, Nor.-Ice., art. 5,
Nov. 3, 2008, 2888 U.N.T.S. 13, 17 [hereinafter Iceland-Norway Treaty]; Treaty on the Zone
of Cooperation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern
Australia, Austl.-Indon., art. 30(2), Dec. 11, 1989, 1654 U.N.T.S. 105, 139 [hereinafter Timor
Gap Treaty]; Agreement Relating to the Exploitation of the Frigg Field Reservoir and the
Transmission of Gas Therefrom to the United Kingdom, U.K.-Nor., art. 28(2), May 10, 1976,
1098 U.N.T.S. 3, 13; Agreement Concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part of the
Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, Japan-S. Kor., art. XXVI(2), Jan. 30, 1974,
1225 U.N.T.S. 113,122 [hereinafter Japan-Korea Treaty]; Treaty Concerning the Delimitation
of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea, Neth.-Ger., art. 5(2), Jan. 28, 1971, 857 U.N.T.S.
131, 144 [hereinafter Netherlands-Germany Treaty].
295. Agreement Relating to the Unitisation of the Sunrise Troubadour Fields, Austl.-
Timor-Leste, Annex IV(j), Mar. 6, 2003, 2483 U.N.T.S. 317, 338.
296. Iceland-Norway Treaty, supra note 294, art. 5 ("The decisions of the tribunal shall
be binding upon the Parties."); see also Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 294, art. 12(5) ('The
decision of a majority of the arbitrators shall be final and binding. . . ."); Netherlands-Germany
Treaty, supra note 294, art. 5(6) ("The decision [of the tribunal] shall be binding.").
297. Japan-Korea Treaty, supra note 294, art. XXVI(5) ("The Parties shall abide by any
award made by the arbitration board under this article.").
298. 2012 Treaty, supra note 5, art. 14(7).
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Treaty. The 2012 Treaty is silent regarding the international protection
that the recipients of licenses located at the border, or that the
unitization agreements, will have.299 There is no reassurance that a
global oil company operating at the borderline will be protected by a
BIT or investment chapter in a free trade agreement such as NAFTA.
In the case at hand, the United States and China do not have a BIT,
but since 2009, Mexico does have one with China.30 0 Article 1 of the
Mexico-China Agreement explicitly states that "contracts involving the
presence of an investor's property in the territory of the other
Contracting Party, including turnkey or construction contracts, or
concessions" are covered by the agreement.3 0 ' The territory protected
by the agreement includes "the maritime areas adjacent to [the
Mexican] coast, i.e. territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf, to the extent to which the United Mexican States may
exercise sovereign rights or jurisdiction in those areas according to
international law."30 2
Would this disposition imply that the Agreement will protect the
investments made by Chinese companies in the unitized area? Which
government would be liable for the damages caused to the Chinese
investments in case the United States decides to allow the U.S. licensee
to initiate unilateral exploitations of the field or chooses to impose
onerous regulation in the area? The existing Mexican licenses in
deepwater fields do provide safeguards to foreign investors under
international agreements; the United States does not.303
299. See id. (failing to address international protections concerning license holders at
borders).
300. See Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Mex.-
China, July 11, 2008, 2626 U.N.T.S. 3.
301. Id. art. 1 (.' [I]nvestment' means the assets owned or controlled by investors of a
Contracting Party and acquired in accordance with the laws and regulations of the other
Contracting Party, listed below ... interests arising from the commitment of capital or other
resources in the territory of a Contracting Party to economic activity in such territory, such as
under . .. contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in the territory of the other
Contracting Party, including turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions, or .. .contracts
where remuneration depends substantially on the production, revenues or profits of an
enterprise.").
302. Id. ("[I]n respect of the United Mexican States, the territory of the United Mexican
States including the maritime areas adjacent to its coast, i.e. territorial sea, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf, to the extent to which the United Mexican States may
exercise sovereign rights or jurisdiction in those areas according to international law.").
303. Guillermo Jos6 Garcia Sanchez, The Fine Print of the Mexican Energy Reform 13
(May 2018) (working paper) (on file at the Wilson Center at Rice University), https://
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/the fme_print of themexican energyreform.pdf.
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For example, the license awarded to CNOOC in the latest
deepwater bidding round specifies that the licensee "may initiate a
proceeding before an international tribunal ... exclusively to determine
the existence of compensatory damages and lost profits and, depending
on the case, its monetary quantification, that emerges as a consequence
of an administrative rescission that is ruled as groundless by the Federal
Tribunals."30 The Mexican Hydrocarbons Law and the concession
specify the grounds for an administrative rescission, which must be
challenged in Mexican federal tribunals, but the investor may bring
claims against Mexico for the quantification of the damages and any
other claim not related to an administrative rescission.3 05 Such claims
include modification of existing legislation by a new government that
affects the concessions directly and forces the licensees to renegotiate
its terms.3 06 International BITs force Mexico to provide the licensees
with "fair and equitable treatment (NAFTA Article 1105, or China-
Mexico BIT Article 5)."307 These claims are protected since the license
recognizes that CNOOC "will enjoy all the rights recognized in
international treaties signed by the [Mexican] State."3 08
In the same vein, the Mexican hydrocarbons law forces
international companies to constitute a subsidiary in Mexico to
participate in the energy sector.309 Hence, the companies operating at
the borderline are, for legal purposes, Mexican companies and
consequently may argue that the agreements between Mexico and the
United States that protect foreign investors, such as NAFTA Chapter
XI, benefit them. All of these questions are not resolved in the 2012
Treaty and can potentially generate disagreements among the
companies and the governments that will be subject to the less than
ideal dispute resolution mechanism of the 2012 Treaty.
As discussed in this Article, the United States and China are in the
process of defining the contours of these issues in the international
investment regime. In many ways, China is emulating the approach
taken by the United States during the 1990s, ensuring maximum
protection to its investors abroad-including investments made by
304. CNOOC-Mexico Contract, supra note 35 (author's translation); see also Sanchez,
supra note 303, at 13 (discussing terms of Mexico's contract with CNOOC).
305. Sanchez, supra note 303, at 12-13.
306. Id at 14.
307. Id.
308. CNOOC-Mexico Contract, supra note 35, at 66.
309. Oil Regulation: Mexico, GETTING DEAL THROUGH (June 2019), gettingthedeal
through.com/area/24/jurisdiction/16/oil-regulation-mexico/.
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state-owned companies-whereas the United States today is in the
process of giving more power to the governments to regulate foreign
investment and to affect their expectations in light of security and
economic concerns. The regulation adopted by Washington and
Mexico City on the protection of foreign investment in the borderline
area will impact Chinese investment in the Gulf and could be subject
to international claims.3 10
V. CONCLUSION
In his book On China, Henry Kissinger analyzed the prospect of
U.S.-China military confrontations.3 1 He insisted that we should avoid
comparing the rise of China to Germany's expansion and the threat it
posed to British global hegemony in the decades before World War I.12
To the contrary, he concluded that Sino-American relations "need
not-and should not-be a zero-sum game."3 13 To Kissinger, China
needs the United States as much as the United States needs China to
continue sustainable growth and maintain national unity.3 14 To
Kissinger:
The United States bears the responsibility to retain its competitiveness
and its world role. It should do this for its own traditional convictions,
rather than as a contest with China. Building competitiveness is a largely
American project, which we should not ask China to solve for us. China,
fulfilling its own interpretation of its national destiny, will continue to
develop its economy and pursue a broad range of interests in Asia and
beyond. This is not a prospect that dictates the confrontations that led to
the First World War. It suggests an evolution in many aspects of which
China and the United States cooperate as much as they compete.315
I can only agree with Henry Kissinger's conclusion. However, one
element that is missing in his analysis is that legal regimes help to
cement competitive cooperation.3 16 Just like in the domestic legal
system, where two parties can compete with each other and, through
the use of the legal system, advance their goals without violently
confronting each other, so too can nations compete without entering
into armed conflicts.
310. See Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 758-59.
311. KISSINGER, supra note 16, at 523.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 525-26.
315. Id
316. Wu, supra note 16, at 262-63.
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Chinese emulation of the rules set up by America and its influence
on international institutions is not a threat to Western values, but an
affirmation that law helps to maintain conflicting relationships. One of
the main advantages of the rule of law is that it keeps actors with
different interests and points of view engaged in a nonviolent process.
Disparate parties can go to court to resolve their differences; if their
relationships change, they can renegotiate contracts; if their interests
differ, they can amend legislation and constitutions. Even if some
actors lose in the process, as long as they believe that down the road
the legal system can also be used to their advantage, peace and order
will remain."' Parties will use the legal toolbox to interact, as opposed
to resorting to violence and starting an armed conflict in the case of
states.
I do not ignore the fact that law is a tool better used by powerful
interests."' It is a tool that tends to benefit the forceful party the most.3 19
But when an incoming strong player is using the rules set up by the
mighty, it allows the major players to engage in a peaceful process. The
legal process will enable parties with competing interests to use the law
to their advantage without resorting into violence. China and the United
States are engaging in this game in different areas of international law,
particularly in the trade and investment systems.320 The legal regime of
transboundary hydrocarbons is just one more area where this dynamic
is taking place.
As this Article demarcated, the Chinese state-owned companies
have strategically positioned themselves in different borderlines
around the world to be at the table of the negotiations taking place
among nations on the rules to develop transboundary hydrocarbon
deposits. The Chinese companies present model unitization agreements
to governments involved, draft dispute resolution clauses, and engage
in dialogue with regulators to set up the rules that regulate the offshore
practice. They are engaging with the rules in areas where two
developed nations have a long-standing practice of cooperation (United
Kingdom and Norway in the North Sea), in areas where the law is still
in the process of development (the Cameroon-Nigeria maritime
borderline), and in areas where there is a disparity in the negotiation
317. See id at 263-64.
318. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95, 95-96 (1974).
319. Id at 121-22.
320. See Wu, supra note 16, at 262-64.
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strength of the governments involved (the U.S-Mexico borderline in
the Gulf of Mexico). The character of the nations involved varies in
each jurisdiction, but the trend is the same: the Chinese state-owned
companies have a say in the game and will use what they learn in the
process to their advantage in the South China Sea.
To be clear, my argument is not that Chinese emulation of Western
rules and practices in the development of oil and gas law is a clear threat
to U.S. national security. The presence of Chinese investment in the
legal regime of transboundary fields is an effort to learn the existing
rules, master them, and eventually modify them to their advantage in
the South China Sea. This strategy only becomes a threat if Western
nations allow unilateral practices to take place within their borders; if
they allow Western companies to bully governments with less
developed regulators in the sector to implement one-sided extraction
contracts; and if the United States is not careful in setting up rules with
Mexico where shared safe, efficient, and effective methods are
employed for the benefit of all parties involved. Any practice by the
United States will set up a precedent in favor of Chinese interests.32 1
The system is being tested. Either Western nations allow the most
influential party to take advantage of the development of the fields, or
they set up a system of control over the forceful party. Whatever they
decide, the Chinese are taking note and will try to employ it to their
advantage.
321. Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 5, at 745-46.
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